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“There ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction,
any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered. ... If all mankind minus one were of one opinion,
and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that
one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. ... The only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others” (On Liberty, Mill 1859).
“[t]he protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people ... But implicit in the history
of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.”
(Justice Brennan in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
“If we accept the unprovable assumption that a complete education requires the reading of certain
books, ... and the well nigh universal belief that good books, plays, and art lift the spirit, improve the
mind, enrich the human personality, and develop character, can we then say that a state legislature
may not act on the corollary assumption that commerce in obscene books, or public exhibitions focused
on obscene conduct, have a tendency to exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial
behavior?” (Justice Berger in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)).
1 Introduction
Does obscenity law corrode moral values and does it matter? Can custom can be shifted by
formal institutions (Aldashev et al. 2012)? A fundamental rationale of free speech regulation
has been to protect what it perceives as the moral fabric of society. Isolating the causal
effects of laws from technological or other factors that facilitate norm change is challenging
(Akerlof et al. 1996; Cooter et al. 2008). Theoretically, laws can play a key role in rights
revolutions (Bénabou and Tirole 2012; Acemoglu 2012; Acemoglu and Jackson 2014; Appiah
2011; Tushnet 2009). Experiments use exogenous variation in the rules of games to mimic the
law (Dal Bó et al. 2010; Galbiati and Vertova 2008; Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012; Croson
2009). We use the U.S. common law court system to present causal evidence on four harms
that have been commonly cited by judges to restrict expressions of obscenity: breakdown of
moral standards1, sexual violence2, child sexual abuse3, disease and drugs.4
1Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989)
2Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
3Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)
450 AM. JUR.2d §§ I, 2 (1995)
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To identify causal effects, the ideal experiment would randomize court decisions. Since
doing so violates justice, our quasi-experiment leverages random assignment of judges, as
their biographies predict rulings. We use the federal appellate courts whose rulings establish
precedent for jurisdictions of 4-9 states. Federal appellate precedents comprise almost the
totality of U.S. court-made law, since the Supreme Court hears less than 2% of appellate
cases. We analyze all free speech precedents pertaining to obscenity since 1958 collected by
Sunstein et al. (2006) and Kastellec (2013). Much of U.S. policy surrounding free speech is
carried out through its First Amendment jurisprudence. Throughout the twentieth century,
liberals supported the broadest First Amendment protections, but First Amendment inter-
pretation has recently become highly contested,5 suggesting that the First Amendment is
perceived to impact societal outcomes.
Judges are repeatedly randomly assigned to panels of three, and the composition of these
panels varies by case. Democrats vote differently from Republicans (Sunstein et al. 2006).6
We leverage biographical characteristics since each judge is assigned to only a handful of ob-
scenity cases. In these matters, Democrats prioritize freedom of speech and expression while
Republicans focus on minimizing the secondary harms of free speech. We also collect data
on judicial biographies (such as religion) to leverage random variation in judicial decisions
that arise from other combinations of biographical characteristics.
Using quasi-experimental variation in legal precedent, we find that the assignment to judge
affects subsequent community values and behavior. In particular, it affects outcomes in ways
that seem to reflect the judges’ preferences proxied by their decision-making tendencies. Pro-
gressive free speech precedent increased progressive attitudes and behaviors. Conservative
free speech precedent reduced sex crimes (with the notable exception of child abuse) and
asymptomatic STDs, in particular, chlamydia. We also conduct a mechanism experiment to
verify that legal precedent affects values, but does not affect behaviors within the short-time
5“How Conservatives Weaponized the First Amendment”, New York Times, 06/30/2018.
6We refer to judges appointed by Democratic presidents as Democrats and those by Republican presidents
as Republicans for brevity. We also use the terms “free speech” and “obscenity” interchangeably. Sunstein
et al. (2006) chose free speech cases pertaining to obscenity.
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frame of the experiment.7 This suggests that the behavioral changes in the population-based
analysis are not due to changes in openness to discussing certain behaviors. Specifically, we
randomized whether we provided information on a progressive or conservative free speech
decision. Thus, changes in norms can also occur via media.8 Several studies have linked ma-
jor court rulings with subsequent changes in public opinion where the case originates and
suggested that media plays a prominent role (Hoekstra 2000).9 Information entrepreneurs,
such as community organizations raising awareness can also act as a catalyst. For example,
Weinrib (2012) documents how, in response to major Courts of Appeals free speech prece-
dent, ACLU attorneys mobilized individuals towards a view that speech should be protected
regardless of its social value.10 We present evidence that newspaper articles about Courts of
Appeals obscenity decisions increase in the Circuits and years with decisions.
Besides the effects of law on attitudes, several additional pieces of evidence are inconsis-
tent with deterrence as sole mediator. First, the role of material penalties is unlikely to be
significant in the short time frame of our experiments. Second, backlash effects found in the
early time period and experimentally would not be explained by deterrence. Third, we also
collected data on state-level sales of pornographic magazines. Radin (1996) and MacKinnon
(1987) argue that the failure to regulate this channel can endanger women. Pornography
media providers were often parties in free speech litigation, but magazine circulation did
not respond to free speech decisions. Fourth, Bhuller et al. (2013) found that roll out of
internet broadband increased child abuse, while progressive obscenity precedents decreased
child abuse. This contrast further suggests that material penalties is not the sole mediator.
First Amendment jurisprudence affects many aspects of society, which has been usually
7Ludwig et al. (2011) discuss the value of “mechanism experiments” to identify the central behavioral mech-
anisms even if the intervention that is tested (or its setting) does not correspond exactly to any realistic
policy option.
8Newspapers, advocates, and community organizers publicize Circuit Court decisions (Pastor 2007; Eagle
2007; Sandefur 2005). Public opinion is affected where the case originates (Hoekstra 2000). Municipalities
increase or decrease regulations or modify existing ordinances in response to court decisions (Berliner 2003;
Nader and Hirsch 2004).
9See, for example, Julia C.Mead, “Village Can Shut X-Rated Store,” The New York Times, Section 14LI,
Column 5, June 19, 2005; Joyce Price, “ ‘Community Standards’ ruling stands; On-line porn judged by
download site,” The Washington Times, p. A6, February 16, 1996.
10Thought leaders may issue cues (Baum and Groeling 2009; Cohen 2003; Bullock 2011; Clark et al. 2014)
that shape perceptions after decisions (Dolbeare and Hammond 1968). Clark et al. (2014) finds significant
use of Twitter after several court decisions.
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studied one at a time.11 Our paper possesses the advantage of being based on randomization
that is naturally recurring, where general equilibrium effects are incorporated. One article
attributes 3.2% of rapes and 2.5% of sex crimes and child sex abuses from 2000–2008 to
the expansion of internet broadband and access of certain content (Bhuller et al. 2013). An-
other study attributes, from 1980–1991, 7% of the probability of giving birth to portrayals
of intimate relations on television (La Ferrara et al. 2012). Broadcast of images critical of
traditional values explained 10% of divorce and separation (Chong and Ferrara 2009). Intro-
duction of cable television increased pregnancy by 52% and acceptability of domestic violence
by 8% (Jensen and Oster 2009). One Supreme Court decision increased by 25-30% the use of
female oral contraception (Bailey 2010). Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2014) attributes 50%
of the sexual revolution to individuals’ moral views on sexual rights. Contraceptive use has
been linked to STDs (Klick and Stratmann 2003) and through peer effects that generate
positive feedback (Card and Giuliano 2011). If free speech precedent gives people more room
for progressive expression and if more progressive community standards make it easier to
subsequently challenge regulations that are deemed as restrictive, this dynamic could lead
to multiple steady-states, in which abrupt shifts in normative commitments could occur
(Akerlof et al. 1996; Cooter et al. 2008).12
Policymakers in both developed and developing countries have taken steps to regulate
norms in many different domains. From environmentalism, to women’s liberation, to abolition
of slavery, law is speculated to play a key role in moral revolutions. Laws do not shape values
in neoclassical models of law and economics, where only deterrence drives the response to law
(Becker 1968); yet a large body of work in psychology suggests that laws can affect people’s
11Policies affected by these cases include the government’s ability to regulate mail, magazines, books, movies,
internet, and phone calls.
12Related regulatory domains have also found large effects. For example, an extensive empirical literature has
examined the impact of state abortion regulations that theoretically (Akerlof et al. 1996) and empirically are
associated with subsequent fertility (Levine et al. 1999), reproductive behavior (Klick and Stratmann 2003),
child outcomes (Gruber et al. 1999), adult outcomes (Ananat et al. 2009), and crime (Donohue and Levitt
2001). Some of these studies have documented large magnitudes, e.g., that legalizing abortion accounted
for 25 percentage points of the 31-percentage-point drop in murder between 1991 and 1998. However, large
effects are typically interpreted from coefficient size relative to the mean of the outcome variable rather than
interpreting from contribution to R-square. The machine learning prediction of abortion attitudes using
judicial characteristics (Chen et al. 2016) found a small contribution to prediction accuracy (“importance
weights” in random forest predictions). The visual counterfactual exercise reported in Section 5.2 confirms
this.
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behaviors simply by telling them what is the right thing to do (Tyler 2006; McAdams and
Nadler 2008). Though we emphasize that our legal cases are about obscenity as defined in
its historical context (not gay rights per se), 45% of our cases mention “gay” or “lesbian;”
including the historical euphemism, “pervert,” increases the proportion of cases related to gay
or lesbian to 65%. Future research can investigate the broader consequences of recognition
and dignity.
2 Background
2.1 Conceptual FrameworkThe law and norms model of Bénabou and Tirole (2012) as-
sumes three motivations for human behavior: (1) intrinsic motivations, where people perform
an action simply because they believe it is the right thing to do; (2) extrinsic motivations,
where material incentives and deterrence influence actions; and (3) social motivations, where
values, norms, social sanctions provided by society affect actions. People accrue honor or
stigma for actions outside the norm. Two different views of free speech emerge: (1) law shifts
social motivations towards what the law values, that is, it reinforces the potential deterrent
effects provided by the legal sanction, or (2) law shifts social motivations away from what
the law values and it undermines the law’s intention. As shorthand, we will label the former
as an expressive effect and the latter as backlash.
The intuition is that material penalties indicate that the policymaker sees a problem.
The judge has information about some underlying activity and issues a penalty when she
believes it should be deterred. Upon observing the precedent, community leaders and indi-
viduals update their beliefs about the underlying distribution. If the activity was very scarce,
then backlash occurs. Previously stigmatized activities become normalized. If the activity is
common, expressive effects occur. In Appendix A, we link the model to the empirical spec-
ification. The model is operationalized in the General Social Survey (GSS), where people
respond to questions about the morality of particular actions. By reporting what is their
perceived morality of an action, respondents report the difference in the social perception of
someone who chooses an action vs. the social perception of someone who does not choose an
action.
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2.2 Legal DataWe collected four legal datasets. First, we create a database of appel-
late precedents from 1958-2008. Sunstein et al. (2006) and Kastellec (2011) collected free
speech obscenity appellate precedents from 1958 to 2004, which we extended to 2008. Their
method began by selecting major Supreme Court precedent.13 Then, they select Circuit
Court cases citing these cases and restricted to three-judge cases that deliberated on the
topic substantively. Additional background is provided in Appendix B. The 175 cases are
listed in Appendix Table 1. A vote is coded as progressive if the judge found that individual
interest in free expression outweighed the state’s interest in protecting individuals from the
effects of speech.
Table 1 displays summary statistics. Appendix Figure 4 plots the quantity of free speech
cases that were decided progressively or conservatively over time. Roughly two-thirds of these
are conservative decisions. The share of progressive decisions declines after 1973. A dramatic
spike is observed, which Songer and Haire (1992) attribute to the causal impact of a 1973
Supreme Court decision.14
Second, we collected District Court cases that cite the same Supreme Court precedents
as our Circuit cases, resulting in 2,960 cases. Third, we collected administrative data on
these cases from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOC) and PACER filings
on District Court cases to merge judge identities.15 Fourth, we compiled information on
judges’ characteristics from the Appeals Court Attribute Data, District Court Attribute
Data,16 Federal Judicial Center, and our own data collection. Variables include: geographic
history, education, occupational history, governmental positions, military service, religion,
race, gender, and political affiliations. Raw data on religion come from Goldman (1999).17
Judges whose religions remained missing or unknown were coded as having no publicly
known religious affiliation. We filled in missing data by searching transcripts of Congressional
13Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and A Book Named
“John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966)
14Our results are robust to removing this spike.
15Sixteen years of Public Access to Court Electronic Records are available on open source sites for 33 Districts.
We used PACER data to obtain judge identities that are missing in the AOC data.
16http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/attributes.html
17Additional religion data are available at http://courseweb.stthomas.edu/gcsisk/religion.study.data/cover.htm.
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confirmation hearings and other official or news publications on Lexis.
2.3 Outcomes DataWe collect eight datasets to measure the impacts of legal decisions.
First, we collated mentions of Courts of Appeals decisions in articles from the major news-
paper for the city in which each Circuit Court resides.18 These are: The Boston Globe, New
York Times, Philadelphia Inquirer, Richmond Times Dispatch, Times-Picayune, Cincinnati
Post, Chicago Tribune, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, Denver Post, At-
lanta Journal and Constitution, and The Washington Post. We collected data from 1979 to
2008 from NewsBank using the search term: (obscen*) w/100 (judgment OR "court ruling")
AND Circuit AND NOT "Supreme Court".
Second, we obtain state-level data on sales of the pornographic magazines, Playboy and
Penthouse, from the Audit Bureau of Circulations. Their circulation data was collected
annually for a single month’s issue, 1955-2010 for Playboy and 1970-2010 for Penthouse.
Third, we collected annual data on crime incidents from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports
(UCR), which begins in 1960. County-level arrest data are available for prostitution, rape,
and drug-related incidents and are constructed to be arrests per 100,000 people. The UCR
series have been criticized for underreporting criminal incidents. With sex crimes, stigma
adds another level of underreporting from the victim’s end. We validate with the one measure
mirrored between the UCR and General Social Survey (GSS): prostitution arrests and paid
sex, which is self-reported.
With the UCR, we include standard controls for crime in the crime regressions: unem-
ployment rate, per capita real income, police employment, the proportion of the population
that is nonwhite, percent urban, infant mortality, and the age profile of the population in
each state and year. These variables are obtained from official U.S. government publications.
County population is used as weights.
Fourth, we collected data on diseases from the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
18Appendix Figure 2 is a map of the 12 Circuits.
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tion19 for 1984 to 2008 and extend it back to 1960 using Klick and Stratmann (2003). We
collected incidence (i.e., new cases) of sexually transmitted diseases–chlamydia, syphilis, and
gonorrhea–for each state. Annual state population is used as weights.20
Fifth, we use the GSS with state identifiers. We use data on attitudes (e.g., towards homo-
sexual sex, extramarital sex, and premarital sex) and behavior. For attitudes, we constructed
binary indicator for the response “not wrong at all”.21 This binary indicator corresponds to
∆ (v) in the model. We also constructed a measure for community standards using the sur-
vey response to whether sexual materials lead to breakdown of morals. In the U.S., the
Supreme Court has instructed the courts to define obscenity according to community stan-
dards. We use GSS survey weights in our regressions as recommended by GSS and construct
demographic controls like age, gender, educational attainment, and race.
Our last three datasets come from a mechanism experiment with data entry workers whose
final paragraph of data entry is a newspaper summary of a recent free speech decision,
randomized to be progressive or conservative. Through three experiments—one of which is
reported in Chen and Yeh (2014)22—we explore the effects of free speech precedent on 1,345
subjects. First, we should expect an effect on self-reported behaviors of data entry workers
if the GSS results merely reflect openness in discussing topics (e.g., paid sex) previously
considered to be private. Second, we measure attitudes. The role of material penalties is
unlikely to be significant in the short time frame of our experiments. If we see an effect on
attitudes of data entry workers, it would be consistent with expressive effects of law. Third,
we measure beliefs about the prevalence of underlying activity, which is a key mechanism in
the model.
19U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Na-
tional Center for HIV, STD and TB Prevention (NCHSTP), Division of STD/HIV Prevention, Sexu-
ally Transmitted Disease Morbidity 1984 - 2008, CDC WONDER On-line Database, November 2009.
http://wonder.cdc.gov/std-v2008.html on October 30, 2010.
20http://www.census.gov/popest/states/.
21The other three response choices are “always wrong”, “almost always wrong”, “wrong only sometimes”.
22Chen and Yeh (2014) use a similar design as the one reported here except it also elicits estimates of how
others respond with incentives for accuracy.
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3 Specification
We use regressions of the form:
(1) ∆ (v)ict = θc + θt +
L∑
n=0
β1t−nLawct−n +
L∑
n=0
β2t−n1 [Mct−n > 0] + ηXict + εct
where β1 captures the effect of progressive vs. conservative precedent, β1 + β2 captures the
effect of progressive precedent vs. no decision, and β2 captures the effect of conservative
precedent vs. no decision. ∆ (v) ict is the moral views (attitudes, behaviors, and audits of
behaviors) of individual i in Circuit c and year t and Lawct is the decision (more precisely,
the share of progressive precedents, but typically 0 or 1). We specify a distributed lag since
we are interested in effects over time. Our baseline specification has four years of lags and
one lead (n = −1 to 4). We extend our specification to include the presence of a decision,
1 [Mct−n > 0], where M is the number of cases (typically 0 or 1). All of our results are
robust and become more statistically significant if we weight by the number of cases in a
Circuit-year, where weights are the geometric mean of Mc(t−n) + 1 over the distributed lag.
In robustness checks, we also include controls, such as the crime or GSS controls described
earlier. We average the five- to six-year lag of community standards because our main spec-
ification includes four lags of the law. We also construct characteristics of the pool of judges
available to be assigned.23 Finally, we constructed Circuit-specific time trends to allow dif-
ferent Circuits to be on different trajectories with respect to outcomes. Any omitted variable
is likely to be small in practice.
Since random assignment is at the Circuit-year level (unlike differences-in-differences anal-
yses of state law changes that turn “on” or “off” once), we expect to see similar results whether
clustering standard errors at the Circuit or Circuit-year level.24 Appendix C presents random
23We calculate the expectations based on the composition of the Circuit pool of judges available to be
assigned in any Circuit-year.
24Barrios et al. (2012) show that random assignment of treatment addresses serial and spatial correlation
across treatment units, since “if the covariate of interest is randomly assigned at the cluster level, only
accounting for non-zero covariances at the cluster level, and ignoring correlations between clusters, leads
to valid standard errors and confidence intervals.” We check results using randomization inference that
assigns the legal variation to another Circuit and the robustness of our results to using wild bootstrap.
The coefficients on the leads serve as an omnibus falsification check for spurious significance.
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assignment checks. We describe our first stage (instrumenting for Lawct using judges’ bio-
graphical characteristics) more formally as follows. Let Nct be a biographical characteristic,
e.g., the number of Democrats assigned to free speech panels. Let pct = NctMct ∗ 1 [Mct−n > 0],
i.e., defined to be 0 when 1 [Mct−n > 0] = 0. Then: E[(pct − E(pct))εict] = Pr[Mct >
0]E[(pct − E(pct))εict|Mct > 0] + Pr[Mct = 0]E[(pct − E(pct))εict|Mct = 0] = 0. Next,
E[(pct − E(pct))εict] = E(pctεict) − E[E(pct)εict] = E(pctεict) − E(pct)E(εict) = E[pctεict].
Thus, pct and pct−E(pct) both serve as valid instruments. Our moment condition for causal
inference is: E[Nct
Mct
εict|E(NctMct ), 1 [Mct > 0]] = 0.25 Notably, as Table 2 and Appendix Figure
7B show, E(pct) is uncorrelated with Lawct, confirming that our controls largely absorb
variation in Lawct that may be due to social trends.
It is also worth noting that for our legal domain, allowing vs. disallowing free speech
exercise is arguably the most salient aspect of a precedent.26 Moreover, newspaper headlines
of Circuit Court opinions typically refer to the court and not the identity of the judges on
the panel.27
The results of an experiment where subjects are randomly made aware of a recent Courts
of Appeals decision can be interpreted in relation to the population analysis. The popula-
tion TOT of the Circuit = (Experimental: TOT direct) * P(exposuredirect) + (TOT indirect of
individuals) * P(exposureindirect). The experiments estimate TOT direct for individuals. The
known parameters are TOTCircuit and TOT direct. The unknown parameters are TOT indirect
and the probabilities.
Since it is possible that 1 [Mct−n > 0] responds to previous years’ legal decisions, we in-
25Early drafts obtained similar results using E[Nctεict|E(NctMct ),1 [Mct > 0] ,Mct] = 0, which
looks at the number of progressive decisions controlling for the number of decisions, and
E[Nctεict|E(NctMct ),1 [Mct > 0] , Qct] = 0, which controls for the size of the court docket and checks if
progressive vs. conservative decisions had opposite-signed effects.
26An interesting feature of the institutional setting, however, is that it is possible to assess this hypothesis
(in conjunction with another auxiliary assumption). If there are other aspects of free speech precedent that
are sensitive to judges’ biographical characteristics, and if these other aspects of free speech doctrine affect
societal outcomes, we should observe correlations between 2SLS residuals and Circuit-year biographical
characteristics not used in the first stage. They are not, which suggests that the allowing vs. disallowing
free speech dimension of these cases is the primary channel through which free speech jurisprudence has
an effect.
27Badawi and Chen (2014) also show there is no stock market response to the identity of the judges when
their identities are revealed in Delaware Court of Chancery, which handles corporate disputes and are
followed closely by the markets.
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strument for 1[Mct > 0] using the random assignment of District Court judges. Appendix D
presents additional details. The demographic characteristics of District judge predict with
whether the judge is reversed by Circuit Courts (Haire, Songer, and Lindquist 2003; Sen
2015; Barondes 2010; Steinbuch 2009), so expected reversal rates could encourage litigants
to pursue an appeal. In practice, this does not appear to be a significant endogeneity concern
for estimates of β1.
Two-layered judicial randomization is not something that presently appears in the liter-
ature on criminal sentencing (Kling 2006), bankruptcy (Chang and Schoar 2013), disability
(Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 2013), welfare receipt (Dahl, Kostøl, and Mogstad 2014), ju-
venile incarceration (Aizer and Doyle 2015), and electronic monitoring (Di Tella and Schar-
grodsky 2013). Our research design is closest to Crépon et al. (2013), which implemented
two layers of randomization in a field experiment. That paper randomized across cities the
presence of an employment training program and, within cities with a program, an individ-
ual’s treatment of training. The non-program cities served as a super-control to distinguish
training vs. no-training vs. no-program counterfactuals. In our court framework, the jurisdic-
tions randomized to have no court case correspond to 1 [Mct−n = 0] while those randomized
to have a court case correspond to 1 [Mct−n > 0]. Then, in those jurisdictions, we randomize
the direction of precedent.
4 The Effect of Judge Identity on Court Outcomes
The Republican party has traditionally been associated with conservative values, which
favor restricting exercise of free speech and focus on its perceived harms. In Table II, we find
that Republicans were less likely to vote for a progressive verdict.28
In Panel A, we examine this relationship at the judge-level. In Column 1, Democrats
were 10 percentage points more likely to vote for a progressive verdict (p < 0.1). The point
28Table notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the Circuit level.
Controls include fixed effects (dummy indicators for Circuit and year), expectations (expected proportions
of Democratic appointees on a given panel), and trends (Circuit-specific). Proportions during Circuit-years
with no cases are defined to be 0. Panel D: GSS (1973-2004) weights are sampling weights. Individual-
level controls are age, gender, race, and college education. Panel E weights are population of state or
reporting agency. State-level controls are percent urban, infant mortality, percent age 15-19, percent age
20-24, percent nonwhite, police employment, unemployment rate, and real per capita income.
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estimate is essentially unaffected with the inclusion of Circuit and year fixed effects in Column
2 (p < 0.01), the inclusion of the proportion of Democrats in the Circuit pool of judges in
Column 3 (p < 0.1), and the inclusion of both sets of controls in Column 4 (p < 0.01). We
can see that Circuit and year fixed effects largely absorb variation in Lawct due to social
trends.
In Panel B, we examine the relationship at the panel-level. Including both sets of controls
in Column 4 indicates that moving from an all-Republican panel to an all-Democrat panel
increases the likelihood of a progressive verdict by 26 percentage points (p < 0.05). In Panel
C, we examine the relationship at the Circuit-year level for the 124 Circuit-years with at
least 1 case. Columns 1 and 2 verify that increasing the sample size by including 1 [Mct > 0]
does not affect the first stage F-statistic. Once we control for Circuit and year fixed effects,
the estimates indicate that moving from an all-Republican panel to an all-Democrat panel
increased the proportion of progressive decisions by 36 percentage points (p < 0.01).29 The
estimates vary little across Columns 3 to 6 with additional Circuit-specific time-varying
controls. We also check that our results have strong Anderson-Rubin weak instruments-
robust test statistics. Were we to use the predicted estimate from the first stage as the
instrument, we greatly increase the F-statistics.30
In Panel D, we examine the relationship at the level of our data analysis with the GSS.
The estimates indicate that moving from an all-Republican panel to an all-Democrat panel
increased the proportion of progressive decisions by nearly 60 percentage points in Column 6
(p < 0.01), which includes GSS sampling weights. We would expect similar point estimates
with Panel C if the number of individuals per Circuit is constant. In Panel E, the data is
aggregated to the state-year for the CDC analysis, and the estimate is more similar to Panel
C, roughly 40 percentage points shift in Column 4 (p < 0.01). For the UCR analysis, the
individual observation is a reporting-agency-year, and the estimate is similar to Panel D,
29We would expect similar point estimates with the panel-level regression if there is 1 panel decision per
Circuit-year.
30Kling (2006) points out that the first-stage becomes a lot stronger with judge leniency (which is the
predicted first stage) as opposed to judge fixed effects. The identifying variation is the same, and both
Angrist and Pischke (2008) and Evdokimov and Kolesár (2017) suggest it is better to not use the predicted
first stage as the instrument.
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TABLE II
First Stage: Relationship Between Progressive Free Speech Jurisprudence and
Democratic Appointees on Appellate Free Speech Panels, 1958-2008
Panel A: Judge Level Outcome: Progressive Free Speech Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Appointee 0.0983+ 0.113** 0.0947+ 0.102**
(0.0474) (0.0348) (0.0446) (0.0316)
N 525 525 525 525
R-sq 0.010 0.288 0.011 0.292
F-statistic of instrument 4.310 10.564 4.511 10.470
Circuit-year controls N Fixed Effects Expectations Both
Panel B: Case Level Outcome: Progressive Free Speech Decision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Appointees per Seat 0.162 0.296* 0.177 0.257*
(0.0979) (0.114) (0.104) (0.113)
N 175 175 175 175
R-sq 0.009 0.315 0.010 0.317
F-statistic of instrument 2.732 6.738 2.875 5.188
Circuit-year controls N Fixed Effects Expectations Both
Panel C: Circuit-Year Level Outcome: % Progressive Free Speech Decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democratic Appointees per Seat 0.336* 0.336* 0.355** 0.357** 0.362** 0.357**
(0.130) (0.129) (0.113) (0.110) (0.115) (0.111)
N 124 612 612 612 612 612
R-sq 0.043 0.365 0.427 0.427 0.436 0.437
F-statistic of instrument 6.726 6.759 9.893 10.480 9.963 10.411
Circuit-years with no cases Dropped Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied
Circuit-year controls N N Fixed Effects FE, Expect FE, Trends All
Panel D: Circuit-Year Level Outcome: % Progressive Free Speech Decisions
(Merged with Individual-Level
GSS Data) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democratic Appointees per Seat 0.529* 0.529* 0.530** 0.589** 0.590** 0.588**
(0.231) (0.230) (0.168) (0.163) (0.163) (0.164)
N 11777 44897 44897 44897 44613 44613
R-sq 0.107 0.366 0.494 0.521 0.521 0.520
F-statistic of instruments 5.244 5.288 9.992 13.072 13.137 12.912
Circuit-years with no cases Dropped Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied
Circuit-year controls N N Fixed Effects All All All
Individual controls N N N N Y Y, weighted
Panel E: Circuit-Year Level Outcome: % Progressive Free Speech Decisions
(Merged with State-Level
CDC/UCR Data) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democratic Appointees per Seat 0.344* 0.336* 0.359* 0.393** 0.332* 0.589**
(0.149) (0.130) (0.131) (0.110) (0.125) (0.168)
N 2193 2193 2193 2192 94137 71979
R-sq 0.386 0.444 0.454 0.483 0.464 0.527
F-statistic of instruments 5.347 6.635 7.516 12.797 7.042 12.335
Circuit-years with no cases Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied
Circuit-year controls N Fixed Effects All All All All
State-year controls N N N weighted weighted Y, weighted
Time Frame CDC 1963-1980; 1984-2008 UCR 1977-2007
Notes: Significant at +10%; *5%; **1%. Additional table notes in text.
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roughly 60 percentage points shift in Column 6 (p < 0.01).
Appendix Figure 7A presents nonparametric local polynomial estimates of the first stage.31
Appendix Figure 7B shows that there is no relationship between the proportion of Democrat
judges in the Circuit-year and the proportion of progressive decisions.
Another unusual feature of U.S. federal appellate courts is that, technically, cases should
only appear in the appellate courts if they present new legal issues (a matter of doctrinal
interpretation). Cases with identical fact patterns should not be appealed. Therefore, we can
present another check of our identification strategy: We should not expect the assignment
of judges in a previous year to predict the decisions in a subsequent year. Table III shows
that the proportion of progressive precedents is not related to the assignment of Democrat
judges to free speech panels in the one or two years before and after the true instrument.32
This result assures us that our instrument is not picking up general societal trends correlated
with the composition of judicial panels and the outcomes of cases. Furthermore, since each
instrument is affecting the corresponding contemporaneous endogenous variable, we will be
isolating the causal effects of Lawct in a distributed lag specification. All lags and leads of
Lawct are instrumented. Appendix Figure 5 illustrates the identification strategy. The jagged
line displays Nct/Mct and the smooth line displays E(Nct/Mct) in each of the 12 Circuits.
We also employed LASSO to select biographical features as instruments for Lawct (Belloni
31Estimation proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we regress the proportion of decisions that were pro-
gressive on Circuit and year fixed effects and we regress the instrument on the same. Next, we take the
residuals from these two regressions and use a nonparametric local polynomial estimator to characterize
the relationship between the instrument and progressive decisions.
32These specifications are analogous to the ones in Table II Panel C Column 6 with a small loss in data due
to lags and leads of judicial assignments being outside the range of the legal data.
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TABLE III
Placebo Instrument: Relationship Between Progressive Free Speech Jurisprudence and
Composition of Free Speech Panels in Other Years, 1979-2004
Circuit-Year Level Outcome: Proportion of Progressive Free Speech Decisionst
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democratic Appointees per Seatt 0.335* 0.326* 0.362** 0.361**
(0.125) (0.129) (0.110) (0.108)
Democratic Appointees per Seatt−1 -0.129 -0.137
(0.0977) (0.100)
Democratic Appointees per Seatt−2 -0.0526
(0.0886)
Democratic Appointees per Seatt+1 -0.0917 -0.0753
(0.0865) (0.0944)
Democratic Appointees per Seatt+2 0.160
(0.101)
N 600 588 600 588
R-sq 0.436 0.438 0.444 0.452
Circuit-years with no cases Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied
Circuit-year controls All All All All
Notes: Significant at +10%; *5%; **1%. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Observations are clustered at the Circuit level. Proportions of progressive free speech jurisprudence and
judicial type per seat during Circuit-years with no cases are defind to be 0 and dummied out. Circuit-year
controls also include Circuit fixed effects, year fixed effects, Circuit-specific time trends, and expected
Democratic Appointees per seat.
et al. 2012) and the results are similar. The F statistics increase up to 104 for the GSS.33
The use of the LASSO-selected instruments provides a check of over-identification that causal
effects of Lawct remain similar regardless of whose tendencies to vote in favor of free speech
is affecting the decision. We find that characteristics related to religion, political party,
and having attended non-elite schools were important predictors of progressive free speech
precedents. In our results, we report estimates using just the Democrat instrument or the
instruments selected by LASSO.34 There is also relatively little literature on the appeal of
33The thirty biographical characteristics we collected are: Democrat, male, male Democrat, female Republi-
can, non-White, Black, Jewish, Catholic, No religion, Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, BA received from
same state of appointment, BA from a public institution, JD from a public institution, having an LLM or
SJD, elevated from District Court, born in the 1910s, 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, 1950s, appointed when president
and congress majority were from the same party, ABA score, above median wealth, appointed by president
from an opposing party, prior federal judiciary experience, prior law professor, prior government experience,
previous assistant U.S. attorney, and previous U.S. attorney. Adding panel-level interactions (e.g., fraction
of judge seats assigned to Democrats multiplied by fraction of judge seats assigned to Blacks) yielded a
total of 450 possible instruments. At the Circuit-year level, the LASSO procedure selected the following
three instruments: the interaction between the number of male Democrats per seat and the number of
judges born in the 1920s per seat, the interaction between the number of female Republican per seat and
the number of judges having an LLM or SJD per seat, and the interaction between the number of female
Republican per seat and the number of judges with above median wealth per seat.
34Earlier drafts also presented a “visual Hausman” test (displaying the distribution of 2SLS estimates using
individual IV that were strong in first stage), suggesting the estimates are not due to the LASSO selection
of unusual instruments.
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lower court decisions, so we also employed LASSO at the District level. All 2SLS estimates
use the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator because of its better small
sample properties and robustness to weak instruments.
5 Estimating the Impact of Free Speech
5.1 NewsAppendix Figure 3 displays a plot correlating the number of free speech de-
cisions and the number of newspaper articles about obscenity decisions from 1979 to 2008
(p < 0.1). The relationship remains statistically significant with Circuit and year fixed ef-
fects. Not every newspaper is available for every year, so we divide the number of newspaper
articles by the proportion of newspapers available (e.g., if only half of the typical newspaper
coverage is available because of data limitations, we multiply by a factor of two to make a
consistent series in the figure). This allows us to compare graphically the number of Circuit
decisions and newspaper articles about obscenity over time. We lack newspaper data before
1979, but the salience of free speech law was potentially even greater during this time period,
which is suggested by the large number of law review articles written in response to obscenity
decisions during the 1960s (Kalven 1960; Magrath 1966; Lockhart 1960).
5.2 CrimeThe majority of laboratory experiments find support for secondary effects
(Donnerstein and Linz 1986; Allen et al. 1995; Zillman and Bryant 1984) concerning en-
dangerment of women (Radin 1996; MacKinnon 1987).35 Bhuller et al. (2013) and Baron
and Straus (1984) also report a link to sex crimes.36
Table IV presents the impact of progressive free speech precedents on crime. Column 1
reports OLS estimates, Column 2 reports estimates with the Democrat instrument, Column 3
with both Circuit and District instruments, and Column 4 with LASSO-selected instruments.
35Most studies find that pornography, especially violent pornography, increases sexual aggression (Donner-
stein and Linz 1986; Allen et al. 1995), though some experiments find no effect or a reduction in sexual
aggression after exposure to pornography (see, e.g., Zillman and Bryant (1984)).
36Kendall (2007) uses U.S. state-level panel data and finds a negative association between internet sub-
scription and rape incidences, but Baron and Straus (1984) find a strong positive association between the
circulation of eight pornographic magazines across U.S. states and crime, after controlling for a number
of possible confounders. Bhuller et al. (2013) exploit plausibly exogenous variation in internet use to deal
with the standard problems of simultaneous causality and correlated unobservables. Their findings suggest
that the increased consumption of obscene content increased sex-related crimes.
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Column 5 presents the number of observations and Column 6 presents the mean dependent
variable. Column 4 displays the central results–progressive free speech precedent decreased
offenses against family and children (child abuse) by over 50 arrests per 100,000 individuals
in the population (p < 0.01), but increased arrests for community vices (prostitution) by 3
per 100,000 individuals in the population 4 (p < 0.1) and increased drug violations by over
30 arrests per 100,000 individuals in the population (p < 0.01). While offenses against family
and children may be perceived to substitute with other activities, property crime is not. In
fact, no discernible effect is found on property crime. The results are qualitatively similar
across IV specifications. The lead effects are always insignificant. In dropping one Circuit at
a time, we find the largest effects of free speech precedent on child abuse were in Circuit 837,
followed by Circuit 6. These Circuits include states throughout the Midwest. The smallest
effects were in Circuits 1 and 9, which include Massachusetts and California.
Table V presents a series of robustness checks on the child abuse results. We find the re-
sults are essentially unchanged with the removal of Circuit-specific time trends38, clustering
standard errors at the state level, removing state-level controls (the lags are jointly very sig-
nificant), removing population weights, removing community standards, dropping 1 Circuit
at a time, and varying the lag structure. Effects arise one year after a precedent, but are the
largest two years later. This is consistent with direct effects of the law, but also slower effects
mediated by the media. Notably, the lead effects are individually and jointly insignificant in
the final row.
To illustrate the magnitudes of our estimates, Figure 1 presents a graphical analysis of
the counterfactual in the absence of any obscenity law–what if neither the progressive nor
conservative precedents had existed. The solid line is the actual crime rate and the dashed
line is the counterfactual crime rate, which is the actual crime rate minus the predicted effect
of obscenity law on crime.
We emulate Bhuller et al. (2013)’s Norwegian study in showing the actual time trends
for various crime outcomes, as well as the predicted counterfactual time trends based on
37The results are robust, but smallest, when dropping Circuit 8.
38Circuit and year fixed effects are still important controls.
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TABLE IV
The Effect of Free Speech Jurisprudence on Crime
Appellate and Mean Dependent
OLS Appellate IV District IV LASSO IV Obs Variable
Average Lag effect (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Offenses Against Family
and Children -11.002 -44.588 -47.575 -56.475 43992 46.063
Joint P-value of lags 0.422 0.000 0.000 0.001
Joint P-value of leads 0.170 0.201 0.418 0.985
Community Vices 1.309 9.641 8.620 2.998 43992 5.104
Joint P-value of lags 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.081
Joint P-value of leads 0.229 0.096 0.737 0.381
Drug Violations 30.956 69.391 90.613 35.542 43992 286.987
Joint P-value of lags 0.038 0.002 0.000 0.002
Joint P-value of leads 0.594 0.148 0.633 0.750
Forcible Rapes -0.413 4.614 2.609 2.190 67017 10.044
Joint P-value of lags 0.367 0.268 0.103 0.268
Joint P-value of leads 0.097 0.154 0.833 0.885
Property Crimes -17.811 -59.631 -98.440 -96.232 67017 559.876
Joint P-value of lags 0.205 0.438 0.241 0.769
Joint P-value of leads 0.118 0.481 0.648 0.598
Notes: Data consist of UCR arrests reported by ORI agencies (at the state-county level). All crime
numbers are per 100,000 population. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses and
clustered by Circuit. Regressions include Circuit fixed effects, year fixed effects, Circuit-specific time
trends, a dummy for whether there were any cases in that Circuit-year, 6-year lagged community standards
(Circuit average response to whether sexual materials lead to a breakdown of morals), and state controls:
percent urban, infant mortality, percent age 15-19, percent age 20-24, percent nonwhite, police
employment, unemployment rate, and real per capita income. Instrument for proportion of progressive free
speech jurisprudence is Democratic appointees per seat assigned to appellate free speech cases in a
Circuit-year. Population weights are population reporting to ORI agency.
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TABLE V
Impact of Progressive Free Speech Precedent on Child Abuse
Robustness of 2SLS Distributed Lag Estimates
The Effect of Appellate Free Speech Precedent on Offenses Against Family and Children per 100,000
(t0) (t1) (t2) (t3) (t4) (t5)
No Trends -91.353 -81.141 + -94.558 * -75.751 -65.686
(64.462) (45.029) (38.112) (44.801) (54.096)
No FE -82.056 -78.434 -75.302 -46.958 -33.439
(60.700) (62.034) (48.448) (36.288) (27.757)
State Cluster -56.888 -51.841 -69.982 + -55.258 -33.322
(36.520) (38.504) (37.600) (37.435) (41.573)
No Ind Control -101.894 -80.435 -117.014 -90.922 -65.367
(121.993) (83.931) (117.420) (123.947) (122.816)
No Weights -13.422 -16.093 -36.758 ** -38.544 -15.718
(13.066) (12.059) (6.881) (10.626) (11.695)
No Community Standards -58.394 + -51.890 ** -70.319 ** -55.459 + -33.165 +
(32.994) (15.079) (7.617) (10.225) (18.893)
No Controls except 1[Mct>0] -226.714 -191.154 -201.168 -109.214 -97.769
(259.576) (243.387) (224.136) (155.064) (126.684)
Drop Circuit 1 -79.711 -63.593 + -83.160 ** -64.068 -39.174 +
(56.486) (32.739) (17.712) (20.529) (21.009)
Drop Circuit 2 -59.057 + -53.648 ** -69.657 ** -57.449 + -30.632
(32.773) (15.847) (8.054) (15.537) (18.628)
Drop Circuit 3 -51.053 * -42.069 ** -68.778 ** -48.348 * -51.910 **
(23.966) (9.930) (5.019) (7.475) (10.390)
Drop Circuit 4 -53.679 -50.913 ** -68.941 ** -52.930 -39.347 *
(35.170) (18.408) (7.055) (10.221) (16.099)
Drop Circuit 5 -62.407 -52.638 ** -66.414 ** -56.349 -25.557
(38.628) (18.477) (8.788) (16.076) (20.075)
Drop Circuit 6 -4.340 -3.666 -31.343 -46.655 -24.286
(18.612) (15.229) (24.071) (33.380) (36.556)
Drop Circuit 7 -60.410 -60.801 * -77.127 ** -58.833 -37.586
(44.221) (24.821) (10.951) (20.536) (36.401)
Drop Circuit 8 -8.701 -6.972 -16.677 -21.846 7.046
(35.268) (20.811) (17.162) (13.570) (15.235)
Drop Circuit 9 -87.683 -102.192 -96.512 ** -75.410 -48.865
(64.317) (115.462) (16.615) (68.031) (56.414)
Drop Circuit 10 -56.827 -52.147 ** -70.156 ** -56.426 -35.038 *
(35.172) (17.691) (7.426) (12.664) (17.195)
Drop Circuit 11 -49.149 + -52.186 ** -70.039 ** -50.317 + -31.980 +
(26.377) (15.151) (8.674) (9.769) (17.630)
Drop Circuit 12 -56.888 + -51.841 ** -69.982 ** -55.258 + -33.322 +
(32.379) (15.681) (6.784) (10.742) (18.044)
1 current 1 lag 3.662 -21.926 +
(9.083) (13.151)
1 current 2 lag -3.711 -28.316 ** -32.645 +
(13.626) (10.936) (17.248)
2 leads 4 lags -56.447 -63.901 * -84.808 -69.766 -52.605
(43.201) (27.651) (58.359) (44.716) (72.366)
1 lead 5 lags -51.692 + -53.219 ** -70.399 ** -53.089 + -27.914 -18.82
(30.496) (14.185) (4.493) (12.023) (18.456) (22.167)
4 leads 1 lag 20.923 -6.330 -13.216 -24.437 30.848 3.625
(t0, t1, f4, f3, f2, f1) (20.030) (21.678) (25.401) (53.931) (27.848) (32.504)
Notes: Significant at +10%, *5%, **1%. Data consist of UCR arrests reported by ORI agencies (at the state-county level).
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by Circuit. Regressions include Circuit fixed effects,
year fixed effects, and a dummy for whether there were any cases in that Circuit-year. The baseline regression is an
instrumental variables specification with one lead and four lags of free speech precedent. Instruments are selected by LASSO.
Population weights are population reporting to ORI agency.
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the IV estimates of the average effect up to 4 years after. Going clockwise from the upper-
left, the graphs report these effects for prostitution, drug violations, forcible rapes, and
property crime. The scaling of the y-axis suggests the effect sizes are between the effect
sizes reported in Bhuller et al. (2013) and Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2014). Since the
majority of cases were decided in the conservative direction, the actual crime rate is lower
than the counterfactual for prostitution and drug violations. The impact on property crimes
(a placebo) is imperceptible.
Figure 1.— What if these legal precedents did not exist?
5.3 DiseaseThe spread of venereal diseases, which have been mentioned as a secondary
effect justifying obscenity regulation, may indicate riskier sexual practices. Infection rates
are determined to a large extent by condom use (Nelson and Williams 2007). Table VI
reports that progressive free speech precedent increased incidence of chlamydia by 50 per
100,000 in Column 4 (p < 0.01), but did not significantly increase gonorrhea or syphilis.
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TABLE VI
The Effect of Free Speech Jurisprudence on Disease
Appellate and Mean Dependent
OLS Appellate IV District IV LASSO IV Obs Variable
Average Lag effect (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Chlamydia 13.029 87.392 74.130 49.636 1117 207.509
Joint P-value of lags 0.014 0.000 0.979 0.000
Joint P-value of leads 0.435 0.299 0.755 0.501
Gonorrhea 13.367 40.036 221.957 186.113 2141 243.911
Joint P-value of lags 0.404 0.263 0.987 0.980
Joint P-value of leads 0.842 0.368 0.900 0.888
Syphilis -3.601 -0.243 1.853 0.681 2141 6.748
Joint P-value of lags 0.172 0.946 0.598 0.756
Joint P-value of leads 0.906 0.609 0.599 0.562
Notes: Data on STD incidence reported by CDC (at the state level). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors are in parentheses and clustered by Circuit. Regressions include Circuit fixed effects, year fixed
effects, Circuit-specific time trends, and a dummy for whether there were any cases in that Circuit-year.
Instrument for proportion of progressive free speech jurisprudence is Democratic appointees per seat
assigned to appellate free speech cases in a Circuit-year. Population weights are state population.
Chlamydia, known as the “silent” disease, typically produces no symptoms for several years,
and is the fastest increasing in recent years among the STDs. In one study, 86% of the infected
partners of infected women were also found to be asymptomatic (Fish et al. 1989).39 The
differential results are not due to differences in screening since screening for different STDs
typically occurs simultaneously. Condom use also does not differentially affect transmission
rates across the three STD types (Holmes et al. 2004). The differential results are more
likely to be related to sorting or screening sexual partners based on their disease status, a
mechanism that has been formally modeled in the economics and epidemiological literature
(Kremer 1996).
5.4 BehaviorArrest data may reflect people’s willingness to come forward to report a
crime, law enforcement’s openness to investigate crimes, or local community leads making
people aware of what constitutes a crime. They are susceptible to underreporting, particularly
by victims in sex-related crimes. To assuage this concern, we use the only measure mirrored
in both the UCR and GSS: prostitution and paid sex (self-reported). We also report a
39In contrast, about 90% of men infected with gonorrhea display symptoms within days of infection, and
40-70% of infected women have symptoms within 10 days (Kretzschmar et al. 1996). Syphilis symptoms
include sores within 10 to 90 days and rashes within 1 to 6 months of the primary infection.
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battery of other behaviors in the GSS, in particular, the behavior of men and a placebo
check (heterogeneity by age). Table VIII presents the findings.
Progressive free speech precedent increased the likelihood of paid sex by 0.4 percentage
points in Column 4 (p < 0.01). The effect on the number of partners per year is insignificant
overall, but significant for men, who report an increase of 0.3 (p < 0.05). For the overall
effect on number of female partners to date, it is an increase of 5 (p < 0.01) and number of
female partners reported by men, it is 11 (p < 0.01). Since this is a stock variable, some of
the effects are likely due to willingness to report (or exaggerate) the number of partners to
date, but this is also a relevant behavior that affects social norms. Men are also 7 percentage
points more likely to report extramarital sex (p < 0.01). Finally, individuals older than 40
are 1 percentage point more likely to be divorced or separated (p < 0.01), but individuals
younger than 40 are 4 percentage points less likely to be divorced or separated (p < 0.01).
This could be due to lower likelihood to enter (early) marriage.
5.5 AttitudesAttitudes are a direct measure of ∆ (v) related to the model. Table VIII
presents the impact on attitudes. Progressive free speech precedent increases acceptability of
extramarital and premarital sex by roughly 1 percentage points in Column 4 (p < 0.01) and
acceptability of homosexual sex by 0.3 percentage points (p < 0.01). The effects on attitudes
towards extramarital sex are more pronounced in Circuit 8 and Circuit 4. These Circuits
include many states in the Great Plains and southeast seaboard of the U.S.
5.6 Summary and CounterfactualsEven though the differences in free speech activity
seem to be aligned with the differences in judges’ preferences revealed in their votes, the
results we have discussed so far focus on the difference in outcomes after progressive as
opposed to conservative precedent. We next examine progressive precedent vs. no decision
and conservative precedent vs. no decision. Table IX summarizes the following parameters
for each outcome: β1, β1 + β2, and β2, scaled by the number of cases per year to report the
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TABLE VIII
The Effect of Free Speech Jurisprudence on Attitudes
Appellate and Mean Dependent
OLS Appellate IV District IV LASSO IV Obs Variable
Average Lag effect (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Extramarital Sex is OK 0.005 0.001 -0.027 0.008 18874 0.097
Joint P-value of lags 0.002 0.001 0.639 0.001
Joint P-value of leads 0.936 0.968 0.576 0.315
Premarital Sex is OK 0.000 -0.057 0.047 0.014 18801 0.633
Joint P-value of lags 0.126 0.666 0.815 0.000
Joint P-value of leads 0.041 0.174 0.949 0.307
Homosexual Sex is OK 0.001 0.017 -0.043 0.003 18073 0.267
Joint P-value of lags 0.805 0.000 0.574 0.000
Joint P-value of leads 0.810 0.228 0.732 0.510
Notes: Data consist of individual GSS responses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in
parentheses and clustered by Circuit. Regressions include Circuit fixed effects, year fixed effects,
Circuit-specific time trends, a dummy for whether there were any cases in that Circuit-year, 6-year lagged
community standards (Circuit average response to whether sexual materials lead to a breakdown of
morals), and individual level controls: age, gender, race, and college education. Instrument for proportion
of progressive free speech jurisprudence is Democratic appointees per seat assigned to appellate free speech
cases in a Circuit-year. Survey weights are provided by GSS.
typical effect per year of free speech precedent.40 This results in a smaller magnitude than
the unscaled coefficients.41 The first column summarizes the findings reported thus far.
The second column reports that progressive decisions–as opposed to no decision–still yields
progressive impacts on attitudes and behaviors, but some of the effects on crime are re-
versed–the progressive precedent reduces sex crimes in three of the four categories. One
reason for this is a form of displacement. The absence of a case serves as a super-control.
Crépon et al. (2013) introduce this idea in the context of a national experiment that random-
izes (a) the presence of an employment training program across cities and (b) the training
of individuals when there was a program. In the federal courts, we seek (a) random presence
of an appellate case and (b) random decision when there was a case.
Differences between trained and non-trained individuals reflect our first counterfactual,
β1. Differences between trained individuals in treated cities and non-trained individuals in
40To compute the effect of progressive precedent in a typical Circuit-year, we multiply the coefficient on Lawct
by E[Lawct|1[Mct > 0]], the typical proportion of decisions that are progressive when there are Circuit
cases, and by E[1[Mct > 0]], the proportion of Circuit-years with a Circuit case. A similar calculation
can be made for the typical effect of progressive precedent taking into account the presence of an appeal:
1[Mct > 0]*E[1[Progressivect > 0]]+Lawct*E[1[Progressivect > 0]]. These estimates can be used to
simulate counterfactuals.
41The statistical significance of the effects are the same as the coefficients so are not repeated here.
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control cities reflect our second counterfactual, β1 + β2. Differences between the first and
second counterfactuals are what Crépon et al. (2013) refer to as displacement. Trained in-
dividuals displace non-trained individuals from employment when there is a limited supply
of positions. In our application, if there is a pre-defined set of free speech regulations, gov-
ernment actors may issue the regulation only in a favorable legal regime; alternatively, the
supply (or arrests) of crime may be limited.
The lack of displacement effects for attitudes and behavior is consistent with law pro-
viding norm-shifting information. There is no reason to expect individuals to delay their
norm changes until a favorable legal regime. This interpretation is further supported by the
mechanism experiment, which we describe below. On the other hand, some of the effects on
crime in Column 1 may be due to displacement. Notably, the effects on child abuse do not
change, which suggests some of its channel may be more attitudinal or less displaced. The
third column shows the impacts of β2. Conservative free speech jurisprudence reduced crime
(except for child abuse) and disease.
5.7 DeterrencePornography media providers were often parties in free speech litigation.
Playboy and Penthouse were competitors at the boundaries of community standards through
the 1970s. In recent times, Penthouse pushed towards near obscene depictions. We found
weak to no evidence of any impact of free speech decisions on magazine circulation. We
emphasize that we evaluate the effects of free speech law rather than pornography itself.
Notably, Bhuller et al. (2013) find that internet broadband increased child abuse, whereas
we find the opposite result of progressive free speech precedents, which further suggests that
deterrence is not the sole mediator for our effects. We now turn to the experiment, where
the short time frame more strongly precludes deterrence as sole explanation for attitudinal
change.
6 Mechanism Experiment
We randomly expose data entry workers to newspaper articles summarizing Courts of
Appeals free speech obscenity decisions and assess whether questions elicited in the General
Social Survey respond to court rulings. We hired 1,345 workers across three replications to
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TABLE IX
Summary of Results
Typical Effects Progressive vs. Progressive vs. Decision vs.
Conservative Decision No Case No Case
Sexual Attitudes
Extramarital Sex is OK 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0000
Premarital Sex is OK 0.0002 0.0004 0.0010
Homosexual Sex is OK 0.0001 0.0004 0.0013
Sexual Behaviors
Paid Sex 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002
Partners Per Year 0.003 0.005 0.013
Number of Female Partners 0.120 0.080 -0.103
Partners Per Year (reported by Men) 0.007 0.012 0.033
Number of Female Partners (reported by Men) 0.276 0.199 -0.157
Extramarital Sex (reported by Men) 0.002 0.001 -0.002
Crimes
Prostitution 0.140 -0.116 -0.705
Drug Violations 1.665 -0.446 -5.402
Rape 0.143 0.086 -0.092
Offenses Against Family and Children -2.646 -1.904 0.289
Sexually Transmitted Diseases
Chlamydia Incidence 1.977 1.223 -0.991
Notes: This table summarizes β1, β1 + β2, and β2 for each outcome, scaled by the number of cases per year
to report the typical effect per year of free speech jurisprudence.
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enter data. After completing the lock-in task (all workers completed 3 paragraphs involving
Tagalog translations of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations), workers in each of 4 treatment
groups and 1 control group were asked to transcribe abbreviated newspaper summaries of a
conservative or progressive obscenity decision or a control paragraph. Additional details are
in Appendix E.
The empirical specification examines the effect of exposure to progressive free speech
precedents
Outcomeit = α + β1Treatmentit + β2Xit + εit
Treatmentit is defined as 1 (for progressive), 0 (for control), or -1 (for conservative) for
individual i in treatment t. Xit are demographic controls. We control for whether the data
worker is male and, in experiment 1 with 197 workers from around the world (mostly from
India and the U.S.), a dummy indicator for being from India. The second experiment is
restricted to the U.S. and had 548 workers and is essentially identical (with an additional
question on beliefs). The third experiment (also restricted to the U.S. and with additional
questions) is reported in Chen and Yeh (2014). We report the results separately; the pooled
results would be stronger.
Tables X and XI Column 4 report that progressive free speech jurisprudence shifted at-
titudes in a direction similar to what was found in the General Social Survey. Progressive
jurisprudence increased acceptability of homosexual sex. The effects are similar in a pro-
bit specification. These effects are robust to dropping the control group. These effects also
remain when we exclude Treatment 4, which explicitly referred to homosexual sex.
Notably, the experiments show that self-reported behaviors did not shift in response to
progressive free speech precedents. The short timeframe of the study precludes actual behav-
iors from changing. The null result suggests that self-reporting norms are unlikely to explain
the results in the population-based analyses. In addition, the short timeframe precludes ex-
posure to materials censored or approved by the law, so the changes in stated values suggest
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that laws can have independent effects on attitudes and values.
The second experiment with only American workers replicates the findings from the first
experiment. Table XI reports that exposure to progressive free speech precedent increased
the likelihood that people favor sex education in public schools by 4 percentage points and
increased the acceptability of homosexual sex by 4 percentage points. These effects are no-
tably larger than the population-level estimates, where the impact on the acceptability of
homosexual sex ranged from 0.3 to 1.7 percentage points. But population estimates are the
weighted average of the direct effects of exposure and the indirect effects of exposure. The
unknown parameter is the probability of direct exposure.
Table XI also investigates whether exposure to free speech precedents affected beliefs
about social norms and we find that it does. Exposure to conservative precedents increased
perceived prevalence of extramarital sex by 2.5 percentage points. This result verifies the in-
formation multiplier described in the model: when legal authorities increase sanctions against
a particular activity, people infer that more people are doing this activity.
The experimental findings on attitudes and behaviors were replicated in a third experi-
ment utilizing 600 U.S. workers (Chen and Yeh 2014). One group was asked to report their
own standards while another group was asked to estimate the other workers’ standards and
was offered payment incentives for accuracy. One group was asked to report their own be-
haviors and another group to estimate the prevalence of the other workers’ behaviors, again
with incentive pay for accuracy. This design differs from the two experiments reported here
in that it (i) used monetary incentives to measure belief-updating of others’ moral views
(community standards), (ii) separated individual from community standards, and (iii) mea-
sured subjective utility. Self-reported behaviors were unaffected as in experiments 1 and
2. Exposure to progressive free speech jurisprudence caused more progressive values (as in
experiments 1 and 2) and, notably, increased the perceived prevalence of progressive values.
However, in communities where sanctioned activity is rare, backlash effects occurred and
progressive free speech decisions lowered subjective well-being. Individuals from less progres-
sive communities became stricter (reporting less progressive sexual attitudes) and identified
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more strongly as Republicans, while perceiving others to become more progressive. Replicat-
ing experiment 2, conservative decisions also increased perceived prevalence of extramarital
sex. These results provide evidence for the law having indirect social effects that may amplify
or attenuate material penalties. It also provides suggestive evidence that legitimacy of law
can affect utility and self-identification.
7 Backlash then Expressive
Sexual norms have changed dramatically since 1958. Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2014)
note that in 1958, 35% of U.S. women engaged in premarital sex by the age of 19 compared
to 75% today. In 1968, only 15% of women viewed premarital sex to be acceptable, but by
1983 this increased to 45%. In 1957, 57% of Americans believed that adults who preferred
to be single were “immoral”, but today, it is no longer considered a moral issue and more
than 50% of adults are single. Bearing children out-of-wedlock was once extremely rare, but
today more than half of births to women under 30 occur outside of marriage (Klinenberg
2012). This is true especially in the U.S. South42 suggesting that temporal variation in sexual
norms exceeds regional variation.
The model suggests that backlash should occur when relatively few individuals engage in
law’s sanctioned activities, whereas expressive law should occur when it is the norm. Early
conservative precedents cause people to update their beliefs that the sanctioned activities are
more common than previously thought, such that they become normalized, which undermines
the initial purpose of the conservative precedent (“backlash”). In the aftermath of the sexual
revolution, progressive free speech decisions have expressive effects, where the informational
effects and the material penalties reinforce each other.
Table XII presents analyses of GSS and UCR for 1973-1993 vs. 1980-2000.43 We confirm
that first stage F-statistics remain high for the two time periods. Column 2 suggests there may
be backlash effects in the earlier time period. Paid sex, prostitution, partners per year, and
acceptability of homosexual sex all increase following conservative free speech precedent. The
42https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/unmarried/unmarried.htm
43The results are robust to variation in these cutoffs.
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TABLE XII
The Effects of Free Speech Precedents over Time
1973-1993 1980-2000
OLS Appellate IV OLS Appellate IV
Average Lag effect (1) (2) (3) (4)
Paid Sex 0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.005
Joint P-value of lags 0.083 0.000 0.036 0.123
Joint P-value of leads 0.643 0.217 0.514 0.824
Community Vices 7.463 -2.050 1.364 9.181
Joint P-value of lags 0.108 0.000 0.056 0.050
Joint P-value of leads 0.074 0.724 0.240 0.089
Partners Per Year -0.724 -0.169 0.043 0.468
Joint P-value of lags 0.101 0.047 0.348 0.031
Joint P-value of leads 0.057 0.242 0.535 0.601
Homosexual Sex is OK -0.003 -0.050 0.001 0.017
Joint P-value of lags 0.394 0.008 0.771 0.000
Joint P-value of leads 0.018 0.680 0.783 0.227
Notes: Significant at +10%, *5%, **1%. Attitudinal and behavioral data consist of individual GSS
responses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by Circuit.
Regressions include Circuit fixed year fixed effects, Circuit-specific time trends, a dummy for whether there
were any cases in that Circuit-year, 6-year lagged community standards (Circuit average response to
whether sexual materials lead to a breakdown of morals), and level controls: age, gender, race, and college
education. Instruments for proportion of progressive free speech decisions are Democratic appointees per
seat assigned to appellate obscenity cases in a Circuit-year. Survey weights are provided by GSS. Crime
data consist of UCR arrests reported by ORI agencies (at the state-county level) and population weights
are population reporting to ORI agency.
opposite is true in later years. Moreover, the fact that self reports of paid sex and arrests for
prostitution move in tandem buttresses our use of audits to validate self-reported behavior.
Appendix B describes historical evidence of backlash. The majority of decisions were
rendered conservative. The model suggests that small perturbation in norms affected by
conservative decisions can lead to shifts from one steady state to another.
8 Conclusion
Throughout history, much controversy has arisen over obscenity. Many countries worried
about the possible impact of obscenity have issued a number of regulations, while courts have
wrestled with the interpretation and legality of these regulations. As social norms change
and technology facilitates broader dissemination of media, obscene content continues to push
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previously-held boundaries.44
Social scientists and philosophers have long debated whether law shapes values and recog-
nized the possibility that laws can have effects through the moral messages that they convey.
We adapt a theoretical framework to analyze the impact of law on norms that allows for
both backlash and expressive effects to occur, depending on the underlying distribution of
law’s sanctioned activity. Empirically, U.S. Federal Court judges ruling on free speech prece-
dents appear to have important effects on attitudes and behavior. Democrats decided free
speech cases in a manner more closely linked to prioritizing individual self-expression, and
they voted to protect free speech. Republicans decided cases in a manner more closely linked
to a focus on secondary effects, and they voted to constrain free speech. The effects of their
decisions seem to be largely attributable to a shift in values and behavior directly relevant
to the preferences of the judges.
Using data on all U.S. obscenity precedent in Courts of Appeals, we show that rulings that
prioritize individual self-expression appeared to increase the value and exercise of free speech
rights. Decisions that focus on secondary effects appeared to reduce crime (with the notable
exception of child abuse) and disease (in particular, chlamydia). Relative to conservative free
speech precedent, progressive precedent was associated with more progressive attitudes and
behaviors on non-marital sexual activity, prostitution, and drug violations, decrease in child
abuse, and increase in asymptomatic STDs.
Corroborating the expressive effects of law, 1,345 workers randomly assigned to transcrib-
ing newspaper summaries of progressive free speech precedent reported more progressive sex-
ual attitudes. Notably, there was no impact on sexual behaviors, which would be expected
within the short time frame of the experiment. In addition, the short timeframe precludes
exposure to materials censored or approved by the law, so the changes in stated values sug-
gest that laws can have independent effects on attitudes and values. Finally, conservative
44The 2016 Republican Party platform declared, “Current laws on all forms of pornography and obscenity
need to be vigorously enforced” and that “Pornography, with its harmful effects, especially on children,
has become a public health crisis that is destroying the life of millions”. In India, couples who elope can
be stoned and kissing in public has led to charges of obscenity. India also authorized the prosecution of
Facebook, Yahoo!, and Google over obscene material. In Russia, newly enacted laws have banned obscenities
in public performances.
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court precedents increased the perceived prevalence of extramarital sex, a key mechanism
for the model of law and norms we adapt.
Methodologically, the twinned experimental and empirical framework developed here pro-
vides causal estimates of court precedent holding all else equal including unobserved factors.
It overcomes the basic issues of omitted variables and reverse causality. Furthermore, it has
the advantages that the exclusion restriction is likely to hold, the LATE interpretation of the
IV estimates are policy relevant (difficult cases without strong legal precedent are the ones
where judges seek guidance (Posner 1998; Breyer 2006)), the general equilibrium effects are
those which we would want to include (allowing for factor migration across Circuit bound-
aries), and the impulse response function in distributed lag is well-identified. We hope it
proves fruitful for policy-makers and judges interested in assessing the impact of court-made
law as well as for scholars and theorists interested in evaluating theories of behavioral re-
sponses to the law, exploiting variation in the sequence of decisions, exploring heterogeneity
of cases, unpacking the direct vs. expressive externalities of law, or investigating long-run
effects.
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Nonparametric local polynomial estimates are computed using an Epanechnikov kernel. Rule-of-thumb bandwidth is used. Shaded area indicates 90 
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A Theory
A.1 ModelWe present a simplified version of Bénabou and Tirole (2012). The model assumes three
motivations for human behavior: (1) intrinsic motivations, where people perform an action simply because
they believe it is the right thing to do; (2) extrinsic motivations, where material incentives and deterrence
influence actions; and (3) social motivations, where values, norms, social sanctions provided by society affect
actions. People accrue honor or stigma for actions outside the norm—for example, if very few people use
drugs, then drug users receive stigma or if very few people donate millions, then donors receive honor–and
information is conveyed by legal decisions on the norms–the distribution of actions in the community. Two
different views of free speech emerge: (1) law shifts social motivations towards what the law values, that is,
it reinforces the deterrent effects provided by the sanction, or (2) law shifts social motivations away from
what the law values, that is it undermines the law’s intention. As shorthand, we call the former an expressive
effect and the latter, backlash.
Individuals maximize the following utility function:
U (a) = (va + y) a− C (a) + ea+ µE (x | a)s
where va is intrinsic motivation (over the range of [v, v]), y is extrinsic payoff, C (a) is the cost of the action,
ea is the public good aspect of the good, and µ is the positive weight agents put on social perceptions,
E (x | a)s, which is other people’s perception of the actor’s intrinsic motivations. Society uses a rule s to
calculate their expectation of the actor’s intrinsic motivations based on her action a. In rational expectations
equilibrium, society’s expectations will be correct and the last term will be µE (va | a).
The principal – the social planner or judge – maximizes over the contract and y:
(1) W (y) = f(U(y) + (1 + λ) ya (y) + σja)
The judge set the costs and σja represents the systematic component of judge j’s decision-making that leads
her to value the public good a more or less than other judges. λ is the shadow cost of resources used as
incentives like enforcement costs.
Due to random assignment of judges with different σj , we have exogenous variation in y in our empirical
application. So, we focus on the behavior of the agent.
In the simple example of two actions (a = 0, 1), the actor receives:
(2)

if a = 1 :
if a = 0 :
U (1) = va + y − C (1) + ea+ µE (x | 1)s
U (0) = −C (0) + ea+ µE (x | 0)s
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Exercising free speech rights corresponds to a = 0 and abstaining from free speech corresponds to a = 1.
e > 0 captures judicial concerns that exercising free speech leads to some harm.
With two actions, the social perception of the actor’s intrinsic motivations follows a cutoff rule. Normalize
c = C (1) − C (0) − y, which is the extrinsic cost difference between the two actions; with ordinal utilities,
we rewrite net utilities as:
(3)

if a = 1 :
if a = 0 :
U (1) = va − c+ µE (x | 1)s
U (0) = µE (x | 0)s
This expression provides a cutoff rule, since if a person chooses to take action a = 1 at some va, then the
person also chooses a = 1 at any v > va, holding others’ actions fixed in equilibrium. This is because the
social motivation and the extrinsic motivation are fixed, while the intrinsic motivation increases. Thus the
cutoff rule will satisfy:
(4) v∗ − c+ µE (va | 1) = µE (va | 0)
The expression motivates a sufficient condition for a fixed point. The fixed point solves the equation:
(5) v∗ + µ∆ (v∗) = c
where we define:
(6) ∆ (v) = E (va | va > v)− E (va | va < v)
At the cutoff value v, people choose action 1 if their va is bigger than v, and they choose action 0 if their va
is smaller than v, so
(7) ∆ (v) = E (va | 1)− E (va | 0)
A sufficient condition for a fixed point is if 1 + µ∆
′
(v) > 0, in which case [v, v∗] share of the population
exercise free speech.
To understand this sufficient condition, note that v∗ + µ∆ (v∗) is the marginal benefit of exercising free
speech for people at the cutoff. The marginal benefit is the sum of intrinsic motivation and social motivation.
c is the marginal cost. The intuition for the sufficient condition is as follows. If 1 + µ∆
′
(v) > 0, then as
the cut-off increases, the marginal benefit will eventually equal the marginal cost c, which is constant, and
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that cut-off will be a fixed point. The more people who exercise free speech, the more honor associated with
abstaining from free speech, which means the less others will exercise free speech. While 1 + µ∆
′
(v) > 0 is
a sufficient condition for a fixed point, it is not a necessary condition. In particular, ∆
′
(v) < 0 is possible,
when a small perturbation leads to rapid social changes as society moves from one steady state to another.
See Appendix Figure 1 for a distribution of intrinsic motivations. Under Jewitt’s (2004) lemma, the shape
of ∆ mirrors the density of v. ∆ initially decreases, then increases. Intuitively, this is because adding a small
mass around the cut-off will shift one truncated mean more than the other. When v∗ is small (most people
choose a = 1), raising v∗ increases E (va | 0) more than E (va | 1), as E (va | 0) includes very few points on
the left tail of the v-distribution. Slightly increasing the support of the truncated distribution to the right
adds a large share of individuals with high v’s. In contrast, E (va | 1) is less affected.
In words, the more people who exercise free speech, the more normalized it becomes, so the more others
will exercise free speech as well: ∆
′
(v) < 0. Multiple equilibria can arise if complementarity is strong enough
or µ is large enough. When 1 + µ∆
′
(v) is negative, there may be unstable equilibria.
Explicit sanctions indicate that the policymaker sees a problem. The judge has information about v∗
because of the Miller community standard test, which incentivizes litigants in an adversarial system to bring
information on v∗ to the judge. The judge issues a sanction when she believes v∗ is too high. Upon observing
the decision, community leaders and individuals update their beliefs about the underlying distribution. When
exercise of free speech is common, v∗ is on the right side of the distribution, so free speech decisions have
expressive effects.
The model implies: (1) laws have expressive effects when v∗ is high (the density of v is falling) and (2)
laws have backlash effects when v∗ is low (the density of v is increasing).
We map ∆ (v) to the General Social Survey (GSS), where people respond to questions about the morality
of particular actions. By reporting what is their perceived morality of an action, respondents report the
difference in the social perception of someone who chooses a = 1 vs. the social perception of someone who
chooses a = 0, which is a motivator for their action (behavior). Audits of behavior
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B Background on U.S. Obscenity Law
Historical studies document backlash by conservatives to stop the Supreme Court from encroaching on
state rights to control pornography during the 1950s and 1960s. From 1959 to 1966, bans on three books
with explicit erotic content were challenged and overturned. Prior to this time, a patchwork of regulations,
local customs, and vigilante actions governed what could and could not be published. For example, the
United States Customs Service banned James Joyce’s Ulysses by refusing to allow it to be imported into
the United States. Different cities and organizations had their own rules for allowable content. The Warren
Court (1953-1969) greatly expanded civil liberties and in Memoirs v. Massachusetts and other cases cur-
tailed the ability of municipalities to regulate the content of literature, plays, and movies. For six years, it
reversed summarily—without further opinion—scores of obscenity rulings by lower state and federal courts,
culminating in the 1969 decision45 that held that people could view whatever they wished in the privacy of
their own homes.
The last ruling led the U.S. Congress to fund the President’s Commission on Obscenity and Pornography.
Yet, the 1970 Commission’s findings that there was “no evidence to date that exposure to explicit sexual
materials plays a significant role in the causation of delinquent or criminal behavior among youths or adults”,
“no evidence that exposure to explicit sexual materials adversely affects character or moral attitudes regarding
sex and sexual conduct”, and conclusion that “legislation prohibiting the sale, exhibition, or distribution of
sexual materials to consenting adults should be repealed” were roundly rejected and criticized by Congress. In
the immediate aftermath, opposing groups authored minority reports that dissented with the Commission’s
view, which was subsequently cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in later conservative decisions. When Chief
Justice Warren was to be replaced by Justice Fortas, a conservative group led by Senator Thurmond organized
the “Fortas Obscene Film Festival,” (it featured transvestites) which not only led to the resignation of Justice
Fortas but also the nomination of Justice Burger instead, who by 1973 issued theMiller test which repudiated
the “utterly without redeeming social value” standard from Memoirs in favor of the markedly less liberal
“lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” (Boyce 2008).
Since 1973, the legal standard defining obscenity in the U.S. has been the three-part Miller test set out
in the Supreme Court decision Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller test defines material as
obscene if “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would find that the material
(1) “appeals to the prurient interest”; (2) has “patently offensive” depictions of sexual conduct; and (3) “lacks
serious literary, educational, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Before the Miller test, the Roth test
allowed banning obscenity when the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
consider the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests. Moral harms
and their “secondary effects” (i.e., sexual violence, disease and drugs) were discussed in the Supreme Court
45Stanley v. Georgia (394 U.S. 557)
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decisions Young v. Adult Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) and Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475
U.S. 41 (1986) regarding obscene speech.
Major doctrinal developments are shown below:
Regina v. Hicklin (1868, Eng) 3 QB 360. - “I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency
of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.” Applied in the U.S. as illustrated in
Commonwealth v. Friede 271 Mass 318, 171 NE 472 (1930).
United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses" 72 F2d 705 (1934, CA2 NY) - “We believe that the proper
test of whether a given book is obscene is its dominant effect. In applying this test, relevancy of the objec-
tionable parts to the theme, the established reputation of the work in the estimation of approved critics, if
the book is modern, and the verdict of the past if it is ancient, are persuasive pieces of evidence; for works
of art are not likely to sustain a high position with no better warrant for their existence than their obscene
content.”
Roth v. United States 354 US 476, 1 L ed 2d 1498, 77 S Ct 1304 (1957) - "Obscene material is material
which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.” The opinion also quoted with approval
the test from Tentative Draft No 6 of the Model Penal Code, presented to the American Law Institute: A
thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor
in description or representation of such matters (expressly rejecting the Hicklin test).
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 975, 16 L.Ed.2d 1 (1966) - For a work to be considered
obscene, three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c)
the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
Miller v. California, 413 US 15, 93 S Ct 2607, 37 L Ed 2d 419 (1973) - The test to determine whether a
work is obscene is (a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value (rejecting “without
redeeming social value” element of Memoirs).
The full list of precedents in our data frame are below:
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  on	  sending	  paym
ent	  for	  obscene	  m
aterial	  through	  the	  m
ails
"obscene	  m
aterial"
262	  F.2d	  357
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Padell
2
1958
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
books	  containing	  "dreary	  pornography"
259	  F.2d	  54
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Keller
3
1958
1
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
postcards	  containing	  references	  to	  adultery
260	  F.2d	  670
Capitol	  Enterprises,	  Inc.	  v.	  Chicago
7
1958
1
Chicago,	  IL	  obscenity	  ordinance
sexually	  explicit	  film
271	  F.2d	  140
Alexander	  v.	  U
nited	  States
8
1959
0
shipm
ent	  of	  obscene	  m
aterials	  via	  com
m
on	  carrier
sexually	  explicit	  books
273	  F.2d	  799
Flying	  Eagle	  Publications,	  Inc.	  v.	  U
nited	  States
1
1960
1
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
"lew
d,	  lascivious,	  vile,	  indecent…
"-­‐-­‐partially	  clothed	  illustration	  of	  a	  w
om
an	  accom
panying	  a	  story	  w
hich	  depicts	  sex
283	  F.2d	  780
Collier	  v.	  U
nited	  States
4
1960
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
circulars	  telling	  w
here	  obscene	  m
aterial	  m
ight	  be	  found;	  pornographic	  photographs
276	  F.2d	  433
Grove	  Press,	  Inc.	  v.	  Christenberry
2
1960
1
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
Lady	  Chatterley's	  Lover-­‐-­‐book	  containing	  explicit	  sex
274	  F.2d	  598
Cain	  v.	  U
nited	  States
5
1960
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
letter	  containing	  sexually	  explicit	  language
273	  F.2d	  529
Em
pire	  Pictures	  Distributing	  Co.	  v.	  Ft.	  W
orth
5
1960
1
Fort	  W
orth,	  TX	  city	  ordinances	  banning	  a	  m
ovie	  theater	  from
	  show
ing	  explicit	  film
s
pornographic	  film
s
277	  F.2d	  631
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Hochm
an
7
1960
0
transportation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterials	  in	  interstate	  com
m
erce	  using	  a	  com
m
on	  carrier
sexually	  explicit	  books
294	  F.2d	  204
W
om
ack	  v.	  U
nited	  States
12
1961
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
atter
pornographic	  ads	  
289	  F.2d	  455
M
anual	  Enterprises,	  Inc.	  v.	  Day
12
1961
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
atter
pornographic	  m
agazines
290	  F.2d	  517
U
nited	  States	  v.	  O
akley
6
1961
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  photographs
293	  F.2d	  449
Ackerm
an	  v.	  U
nited	  States
9
1961
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
sexually	  explicit	  letters
309	  F.2d	  362
Excellent	  Publications,	  Inc.	  v.	  U
nited	  States
1
1962
1
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
photos	  of	  nude/partially	  nude	  w
om
en
300	  F.2d	  78
Kahm
	  v.	  U
nited	  States
5
1962
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  w
ritten	  m
aterials,	  advertisem
ents	  for	  those	  m
aterials
316	  F.2d	  813
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Darnell
2
1963
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
private	  letter	  using	  sw
ear	  w
ords
316	  F.2d	  873
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Zuideveld
7
1963
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials
sexually	  suggestive	  m
agazines,	  m
em
bership	  in	  a	  sexual	  pen	  pal	  club
338	  F.2d	  12
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Ginzburg
3
1964
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  m
agazine
333	  F.2d	  963
O
utdoor	  Am
erican	  Corp.	  v.	  Philadelphia
3
1964
0
PA	  obscenity	  statute
pornographic	  m
agazines
350	  F.2d	  155
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Klaw
2
1965
1
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  illustrations
353	  F.2d	  614
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Davis
2
1965
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
records	  and	  record	  labels	  w
hich	  depicted	  sex	  in	  som
e	  w
ay
340	  F.2d	  59
Haldem
an	  v.	  U
nited	  States
10
1965
1
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
atter
sexually	  explicit	  pam
phlets	  and	  advertising
358	  F.2d	  935
Books,	  Inc.	  v.	  U
nited	  States
1
1966
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
book	  explicitly	  describing	  characters'	  sexual	  adventures
359	  F.2d	  402
W
enzler	  v.	  Pitchess
9
1966
0
CA	  obscenity	  law
pornographic	  videos	  
357	  F.2d	  855
U
nited	  States	  v.	  W
est	  Coast	  N
ew
s	  Co.
6
1966
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial,	  transportation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial	  by	  com
m
on	  carrier
sexually	  explicit	  book
367	  F.2d	  889
U
nited	  States	  v.	  O
ne	  Carton	  Positive	  M
otion	  Picture	  Film
2
1966
1
prohibition	  on	  im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
sexually	  explicit	  film
	  w
hich	  also	  depicts	  self-­‐m
utilation
385	  F.2d	  209
Culbertson	  v.	  California
9
1967
1
CA	  statute	  prohibiting	  sale	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
photographs	  of	  "scantily	  clad	  w
om
en"
373	  F.2d	  635
U
nited	  States	  v.	  56	  Cartons
4
1967
0
im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  m
agazines
373	  F.2d	  633
U
nited	  States	  v.	  392	  Copies	  of	  M
agazine
4
1967
0
im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  m
agazines
384	  F.2d	  694
Arm
ijo	  v.	  U
nited	  States
9
1967
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
sexually	  explicit	  letters
404	  F.2d	  196
U
nited	  States	  v.	  	  A	  M
otion	  Picture	  Entitled	  "I	  am
	  Curious-­‐Yellow
"
2
1968
1
prohibition	  on	  im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
film
	  w
ith	  sexually	  explicit	  scenes
389	  F.2d	  200
Luros	  v.	  U
nited	  States
8
1968
1
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials
nudist	  m
agazines	  and	  sexually	  explicit	  novels
418	  F.2d	  1051
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Baranov
9
1969
1
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
booklets	  containing	  pornographic	  photos
418	  F.2d	  82
Grove	  Press,	  Inc.	  v.	  Philadelphia
3
1969
1
PA	  obscenity	  statute	  and	  com
m
on	  law
	  nuisance
pornographic	  film
422	  F.2d	  34
U
nited	  States	  v.	  W
ild
2
1969
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
slides	  of	  pornographic	  im
ages
435	  F.2d	  228
Drive	  In	  Theatres,	  Inc.	  v.	  Huskey
4
1970
1
N
C	  state	  obscenity	  law
	  as	  interpreted	  by	  the	  Rutherford	  County	  sheriff
any	  m
ovie	  not	  rated	  G
436	  F.2d	  1289
O
verstock	  Book	  Co.	  v.	  Barry
2
1970
0
distribution	  of	  pornography
books,	  m
agazines,	  etc.	  w
hich	  included	  "hard-­‐core	  pornography"
431	  F.2d	  655
M
iller	  v.	  U
nited	  States
9
1970
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
obscene	  books,	  m
agazines,	  and	  ads
433	  F.2d	  1252
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Dellapia
2
1970
1
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  film
s
433	  F.2d	  932
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Jacobs
9
1970
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  photographs	  and	  ads
431	  F.2d	  272
Childs	  v.	  O
regon
9
1970
0
dissem
inating	  obscene	  m
atter	  in	  violation	  of	  O
R	  state	  law
sexually	  explicit	  book
432	  F.2d	  705
U
nited	  States	  v.	  35	  M
M
.	  M
otion	  Picture	  Film
	  etc.
2
1970
1
im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
sexually	  explicit	  film
432	  F.2d	  420
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Ten	  Erotic	  Paintings
4
1970
1
im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
sexually	  explicit	  paintings
470	  F.2d	  386
Huffm
an	  v.	  U
nited	  States
12
1971
0
DC	  obscenity	  ordinance
pornographic	  m
agazines
448	  F.2d	  583
U
nited	  States	  v.	  M
anarite
2
1971
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  m
agazines,	  film
s,	  and	  playing	  cards
445	  F.2d	  945
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Ew
ing
10
1971
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
atter
pornographic	  m
aterial	  and	  advertisem
ents
467	  F.2d	  41
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Pellegrino
9
1972
1
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
advertisem
ents	  for	  tw
o	  sexually	  explicit	  books
465	  F.2d	  282
Tallm
an	  v.	  U
nited	  States
7
1972
0
uttering	  obscene	  language	  on	  the	  radio
language	  is	  not	  described
465	  F.2d	  1096
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Young
9
1972
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
obscene	  advertisem
ents
455	  F.2d	  899
U
nited	  States	  v.	  M
iller
9
1972
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
obscene	  advertisem
ents
459	  F.2d	  282
Southeastern	  Prom
otions,	  Ltd.	  v.	  O
klahom
a	  City
10
1972
1
O
klahom
a	  City's	  refusal	  to	  lease	  its	  auditorium
	  
the	  m
usical	  "Hair"
454	  F.2d	  280
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Fesenm
eyer
9
1972
0
transporting	  in	  interstate	  com
m
erce	  obscene	  m
aterial
unclear
467	  F.2d	  1126
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Sm
ith
7
1972
1
uttering	  obscene	  language	  on	  the	  radio
used	  profane	  language	  on	  a	  radio	  broadcast
481	  F.2d	  605
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Gates
5
1973
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials
a	  letter	  w
hich	  included	  sexually	  explicit	  language
486	  F.2d	  894
Southeastern	  Prom
otions,	  Ltd.	  v.	  Conrad
6
1973
0
TN
	  obscenity	  com
m
on	  law
	  and	  statutes
a	  perform
ance	  of	  the	  play	  "Hair"
475	  F.2d	  65
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Palladino
1
1973
1
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
books	  and	  brochures	  depicting	  and	  describing	  porn	  and	  sex
473	  F.2d	  1297
Cinecom
	  Theaters	  M
idw
est	  States,	  Inc.	  v.	  Ft.	  W
ayne
7
1973
1
Fort	  W
ayne,	  IN
	  city	  ordinance	  prohibiting	  nudity	  in	  drive-­‐in	  m
ovies
film
s	  involving	  nudity
481	  F.2d	  307
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Ham
ling
9
1973
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
obscene	  advertisem
ents	  and	  books
481	  F.2d	  206
U
nited	  States	  v.	  O
ne	  Reel	  of	  Film
1
1973
0
prohibition	  on	  im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  film
487	  F.2d	  331
U
nited	  States	  v.	  M
illican
5
1973
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  film
	  and	  m
agazine	  advertising	  the	  film
485	  F.2d	  574
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Cote
5
1973
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  film
s,	  m
agazines,	  and	  advertisem
ents	  for	  those	  film
s	  and	  m
agazines
484	  F.2d	  1149
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Thevis
5
1973
1
transporting	  obscene	  m
aterial	  on	  a	  com
m
on	  carrier	  in	  interstate	  com
m
ercepornographic	  m
agazines
494	  F.2d	  499
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Groner
5
1974
0
transporting	  obscene	  m
aterial	  on	  a	  com
m
on	  carrier	  in	  interstate	  com
m
erce"obscene	  books"
502	  F.2d	  973
Brubaker	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education
7
1974
1
dism
issal	  of	  teachers	  for	  distributing	  obscene	  m
aterial	  to	  m
inors
a	  brochure	  describing	  W
oodstock	  and	  its	  sexual	  excess
487	  F.2d	  1300
Patterson	  v.	  U
nited	  States
5
1974
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials
a	  letter	  containing	  pornographic	  photographs
502	  F.2d	  1300
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Ratner
5
1974
0
federal	  obscenity	  statute
advertisem
ents	  for	  pornographic	  m
aterials
490	  F.2d	  499
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Palladino
1
1974
1
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
book	  and	  brochure	  w
hich	  depicted/described	  pornographic	  photos
507	  F.2d	  294
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Harding
10
1974
0
receipt	  of	  obscene	  m
atter	  transported	  through	  interstate	  com
m
erce
obscene	  books	  and	  film
s
490	  F.2d	  78
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Sulaim
an
5
1974
0
federal	  obscenity	  statute
pornographic	  ads	  and	  film
s
505	  F.2d	  1247
U
nited	  States	  v.	  M
iller
9
1974
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  books	  and	  m
agazines
507	  F.2d	  1100
M
iller	  v.	  U
nited	  States
9
1974
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  books	  and	  m
agazines
491	  F.2d	  956
,	  Sharpie,	  Inc.
2
1974
0
im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  film
502	  F.2d	  391
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Pryba
12
1974
0
interstate	  transportation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  film
Appendix	  Table	  I:	  List	  of	  Free	  Speech	  Appellate	  Precedent
Citation
Case	  N
am
e
Circuit
Year
Progressive
Type	  of	  Free	  Speech	  Regulation
Type	  of	  Free	  Speech	  Expression
500	  F.2d	  733
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Hill
5
1974
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials;	  transportation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterials	  via	  com
m
on	  carrier
pornographic	  film
s
506	  F.2d	  1251
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Carter
6
1974
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials,	  use	  of	  com
m
on	  carrier	  to	  transport	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  film
s
505	  F.2d	  824
Sm
ith	  v.	  U
nited	  States
6
1974
0
interstate	  transportation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  film
s
490	  F.2d	  76
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Thevis
5
1974
0
transporting	  obscene	  m
aterial	  on	  a	  com
m
on	  carrier	  in	  interstate	  com
m
ercepornographic	  m
agazines
506	  F.2d	  511
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Friedm
an
8
1974
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  m
agazines
509	  F.2d	  368
U
nited	  States	  v.	  W
om
ack
12
1974
0
interstate	  transportation	  of	  obscene	  m
atter,	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
atter
pornographic	  m
agazines
502	  F.2d	  419
Huffm
an	  v.	  U
nited	  States
12
1974
1
DC	  obscenity	  ordinance
pornographic	  m
agazines
503	  F.2d	  189
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Gow
er
12
1974
0
DC	  obscenity	  ordinance
pornographic	  photographs	  and	  film
498	  F.2d	  934
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Alexander
2
1974
0
prohibition	  on	  interstate	  transportation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  photos
490	  F.2d	  73
U
nited	  States	  v.	  N
ew
	  O
rleans	  Book	  M
art,	  Inc.
5
1974
0
transporting	  obscene	  m
aterial	  on	  a	  com
m
on	  carrier	  in	  interstate	  com
m
ercepornographic	  publications	  and	  film
515	  F.2d	  397
Illinois	  Citizens	  Com
m
ittee	  for	  Broadcasting	  v.	  FCC
12
1974
0
broadcasting	  obscene	  m
aterial
radio	  call-­‐in	  show
496	  F.2d	  441
Am
ato	  v.	  Divine
7
1974
1
W
I	  state	  obscenity	  law
sexually	  explicit	  m
agazines
491	  F.2d	  714
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Ew
ing
10
1974
1
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
atter
unclear
491	  F.2d	  697
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Harding
10
1974
1
receipt	  of	  obscene	  m
atter	  transported	  through	  interstate	  com
m
erce
unclear
504	  F.2d	  1012
U
nited	  States	  v.	  W
asserm
an
5
1974
1
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials
unclear-­‐-­‐som
ehow
	  pornographic
524	  F.2d	  1244
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Slepicoff
5
1975
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials
"obscene	  advertising	  brochures"
514	  F.2d	  923
Clicque	  v.	  U
nited	  States
5
1975
1
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials
letter	  containing	  sexually	  explicit	  language
523	  F.2d	  3
W
alker	  v.	  Dillard
4
1975
1
VA	  state	  law
	  crim
inalizing	  cursing	  at	  som
eone	  over	  the	  phone
M
rs.	  W
alker	  sw
ore	  at	  her	  neighbor	  over	  the	  phone
518	  F.2d	  20
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Dachsteiner
9
1975
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
atter
obscene	  advertisem
ents
520	  F.2d	  913
U
nited	  States	  v.	  M
arks
6
1975
0
interstate	  transportation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  film
s
526	  F.2d	  48
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Am
erican	  Theater	  Corp
8
1975
0
transporting	  in	  interstate	  com
m
erce	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  film
s
513	  F.2d	  264
M
cKinney	  v.	  Parsons
5
1975
0
Birm
ingham
,	  AL	  obscenity	  ordinance
pornographic	  m
agazines	  and	  film
s
523	  F.2d	  369
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Danley
9
1975
0
federal	  obscenity	  law
s
unclear
541	  F.2d	  810
U
nited	  States	  v.	  O
bscene	  M
agazines,	  Film
s	  &
	  Cards
9
1976
1
forfeiture	  of	  obscene	  m
aterials	  but	  unclear	  w
hat	  underlying	  offense	  is
"exhibits"
543	  F.2d	  723
W
asserm
an	  v.	  M
unicipal	  Court	  of	  Alham
bra	  Judicial	  Dist.
9
1976
0
CA	  state	  law
	  crim
inalizing	  distribution	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
obscene	  brochure
533	  F.2d	  192
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Linetsky
5
1976
1
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  advertisem
ents	  and	  film
s
526	  F.2d	  989
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Thevis
5
1976
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  m
agazines,	  books,	  and	  advertisem
ents
528	  F.2d	  784
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Friedm
an
10
1976
0
interstate	  transportation	  for	  purpose	  of	  sale	  and	  distribution
sexually	  explicit	  book
538	  F.2d	  325
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Baranov
4
1976
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
560	  F.2d	  720
Robinson	  v.	  Parsons
5
1977
0
Birm
ingham
,	  AL	  obscenity	  ordinance
"obscene	  m
aterials"
565	  F.2d	  566
U
nited	  States	  v.	  2200	  Paper	  Back	  Books
9
1977
1
im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
obscene	  books
549	  F.2d	  1369
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Christian
10
1977
0
interstate	  transportation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial	  w
ith	  com
m
on	  carrier
pornographic	  film
564	  F.2d	  1294
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Tupler
9
1977
1
interstate	  transportation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  film
s
562	  F.2d	  185
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Various	  Articles	  of	  O
bscene	  M
erchandise,	  Schedule	  1303
2
1977
0
im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  photos
556	  F.2d	  9
Pacifica	  Foundation	  v.	  Federal	  Com
m
unications	  Com
m
ission
12
1977
1
FCC	  ruling
seven	  "patently	  offensive"	  w
ords
562	  F.2d	  954
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Glassm
an
5
1977
0
interstate	  transportation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterials
sexually	  explicit	  film
s
558	  F.2d	  364
Am
ato	  v.	  Divine
7
1977
1
W
I	  obscenity	  law
unclear
581	  F.2d	  244
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Blucher
10
1978
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
atter
obscene	  advertising
575	  F.2d	  1303
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Dost
10
1978
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
atter
obscene	  advertising
582	  F.2d	  1016
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Bush
5
1978
1
transporting	  obscene	  m
aterial	  on	  a	  com
m
on	  carrier	  in	  interstate	  com
m
ercepornographic	  film
s
585	  F.2d	  164
U
nited	  States	  v.	  M
arks
6
1978
0
interstate	  transportation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  film
s
583	  F.2d	  1030
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Cohen
8
1978
0
m
ailing	  and	  use	  of	  com
m
on	  carriers	  to	  transport	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  film
s
605	  F.2d	  210
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Sandy
6
1979
0
interstate	  transportation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  film
s
600	  F.2d	  394
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Various	  Articles	  of	  O
bscene	  M
erchandise,	  Schedule	  1769
2
1979
0
im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  film
s	  and	  other	  m
aterials
610	  F.2d	  428
Sovereign	  N
ew
s	  Co.	  v.	  Corrigan
6
1979
0
O
H	  obscenity	  statute
unclear-­‐-­‐som
ehow
	  pornographic
602	  F.2d	  1192
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Grassi
5
1979
0
transporting	  obscene	  m
aterial	  on	  a	  com
m
on	  carrier	  in	  interstate	  com
m
erce;	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial,	  etc.
631	  F.2d	  497
Entertainm
ent	  Concepts	  III	  v.	  M
aciejew
ski
7
1980
1
W
estm
ont,	  IL	  city	  ordinances
adult	  m
ovie	  theaters
610	  F.2d	  1353
Penthouse	  International	  	  Ltd.	  v.	  M
cAuliffe
5
1980
0
GA	  state	  obscenity	  law
pornographic	  m
agazines
648	  F.2d	  1020
Red	  Bluff	  Drive-­‐In	  Inc.	  v.	  Vance
5
1981
1
TX	  obscenity	  statute
adult	  entertainm
ent	  providers	  raise	  a	  facial	  challenge	  to	  constitutionality	  of	  TX	  statute
653	  F.2d	  381
U
nited	  States	  v.	  O
bscene	  M
agazines,	  	  Book	  &
	  Advertising	  M
aterials,	  et	  al.
9
1981
0
im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
obscene	  m
agazines	  and	  a	  book
638	  F.2d	  762
Reeves	  v.	  M
cConn
5
1981
0
Houston	  noise	  am
plification	  ordinance	  prohibiting	  the	  am
plification	  of	  obscene	  w
ords
obscene	  w
ords
646	  F.2d	  237
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Battista
6
1981
0
interstate	  transportation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  film
649	  F.2d	  783
Piepenburg	  v.	  Cutler
10
1981
0
U
T	  statute	  prohibiting	  exhibition	  of	  pornographic	  film
s
pornographic	  film
613	  F.2d	  787
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Thom
as
10
1981
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  film
s	  and	  a	  catalog
675	  F.2d	  1365
Fehlhaber	  v.	  N
orth	  Carolina
4
1982
0
N
C	  state	  obscenity	  nuisance	  law
"pictorial	  obscenity"-­‐-­‐plaintiffs	  here	  are	  ow
ners	  of	  adult	  bookstores
688	  F.2d	  1088
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Langford
7
1982
0
sending	  child	  pornography	  through	  the	  m
ails
photographs	  and	  negatives	  depicting	  child	  pornography
679	  F.2d	  826
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Bagnell
11
1982
0
interstate	  transportation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial	  w
ith	  com
m
on	  carrier;	  interstate	  transportation	  w
ith	  intent	  to	  sell
pornographic	  film
s
678	  F.2d	  433
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Various	  Articles	  of	  O
bscene	  M
erchandise,	  Schedule	  2102
2
1982
0
im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  film
s/m
agazines
684	  F.2d	  616
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Gilm
an
9
1982
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
sexually	  explicit	  m
agazines	  and	  brochures
674	  F.2d	  484
Sovereign	  N
ew
s	  Co.	  v.	  Falke
6
1982
0
O
H	  obscenity	  statute
unclear-­‐-­‐som
ehow
	  pornographic
674	  F.2d	  486
Turoso	  v.	  Cleveland	  M
unicipal	  Court
6
1982
0
O
H	  obscenity	  statute
unclear;	  consolidated	  appeals
722	  F.2d	  1274
Janicki	  v.	  Pizza
6
1983
0
Toledo,	  O
H	  obscenity	  ordinances
plaintiffs	  are	  clerks	  at	  an	  adult	  bookstore
705	  F.2d	  41
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Various	  Articles	  of	  O
bscene	  M
erchandise,	  Schedule	  2127
2
1983
0
im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  m
agazines
702	  F.2d	  925
Penthouse	  International,	  Ltd.	  v.	  M
cAuliffe
11
1983
0
GA	  obscenity	  law
the	  m
ovie	  Caligula
709	  F.2d	  132
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Various	  Articles	  of	  O
bscene	  M
erchandise,	  Schedule	  2102
2
1983
1
im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
726	  F.2d	  1191
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Thom
a
7
1984
0
m
ailing	  child	  pornography	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  sale
child	  pornography	  film
747	  F.2d	  824
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Petrov
2
1984
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial
pornographic	  photos
746	  F.2d	  458
U
nited	  States	  v.	  M
errill
9
1984
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  playing	  cards	  
744	  F.2d	  1061
O
lson	  v.	  Leeke
4
1984
0
SC	  state	  obscenity	  law
pornographic	  printed	  m
aterial
750	  F.2d	  596
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Various	  Articles	  of	  M
erchandise,	  Seizure	  N
o.	  170	  &
	  182
7
1984
1
im
portation	  of	  obscene	  m
aterial
sexually	  explicit	  m
agazines
725	  F.2d	  482
J-­‐R	  Distribs.	  v.	  Eikenberry
9
1984
1
W
A	  obscenity	  law
unclear-­‐-­‐consolidated	  appeal
780	  F.2d	  1389
U
pper	  M
idw
est	  Booksellers	  Assoc.	  v.	  M
inneapolis
8
1985
0
M
inneapolis	  city	  ordinance
pornographic	  m
agazines
779	  F.2d	  1177
Brooks	  v.	  Seiter
6
1985
1
O
H	  state	  law
	  preventing	  prisoners	  from
	  receiving	  "obscene"	  or	  "inflam
m
atory"	  m
aterials
pornographic	  pam
phlets	  and	  m
agazines
801	  F.2d	  740
Hoover	  v.	  Byrd
5
1986
0
TX	  obscenity	  statute
"com
m
ercial	  obscenity"
804	  F.2d	  1104
BSA,	  Inc.	  v.	  King	  County
9
1986
1
W
A	  county	  ordinances	  
barroom
	  nude	  dancing
795	  F.2d	  765
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Hurt
9
1986
0
m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterials
pornographic	  film
s
Citation
Case	  N
am
e
Circuit
Year
Progressive
Type	  of	  Free	  Speech	  Regulation
Type	  of	  Free	  Speech	  Expression
803	  F.2d	  174
U
nited	  States	  v.	  M
archant
5
1986
0
know
ingly	  receiving	  child	  pornography
pornographic	  m
agazines	  featuring	  children
791	  F.2d	  463
Paducah	  v.	  Investm
ent	  Entertainm
ent,	  Inc.
6
1986
1
Paducah,	  KY	  obscenity	  ordinance
pornographic	  m
ovie	  theaters,	  adult	  bookstores,	  etc.
826	  F.2d	  708
M
oses	  v.	  County	  of	  Kenosha
7
1987
0
Kenosha	  County,	  W
I	  obscenity	  ordinance
adult	  bookstores
819	  F.2d	  451
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Guglielm
i
4
1987
0
prohibition	  on	  m
ailing	  obscene	  m
aterial;	  use	  of	  com
m
on	  carrier	  to	  transport	  obscene	  m
aterial
film
s	  depicting	  bestiality
816	  F.2d	  1326
Polykoff	  v.	  Collins
9
1987
0
AZ	  obscenity	  statute
m
aterials	  sold	  at	  adult	  bookstores
848	  F.2d	  923
U
nited	  States	  v.	  Zangger
8
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C Randomization
According to interviews, each court implements randomization differently. In some Circuits, two to three
weeks before the oral argument, a computer program randomly assigns available judges to panels who
will hear cases. In other Circuits, judges are randomly assigned to panels up to a year in advance; cases
that arise are randomly assigned to panels. Some judges take a reduced caseload if retired or visiting, but
all are randomly assigned by a computer algorithm. Senior judges can opt out of death penalty cases in
some Circuits, but they would do so before random assignment. Chen and Sethi (2011) formally tests for
randomization by showing that case characteristics as determined by District Courts are not correlated with
the characteristics of the Courts of Appeals judges assigned to the case.
Even if judges are randomly assigned, because our data comprise published opinions, several additional
issues need to be considered: settlement, publication, and strategic use of keywords or citation. In Courts
of Appeals, judges are revealed very late, after litigants file their briefs, sometimes only a few days before
the hearing, if there is a hearing, which gives little opportunity and incentive for settlement upon learning
the identity of the panel. Most of the litigation costs are sunk by that point, and when the D.C. Circuit
began announcing judges earlier, it did not affect settlement rates (Jordan 2007). Unpublished cases are not
supposed to have precedential value. Unpublished cases are deemed as routine and easy: studies find that
judicial ideology predicts neither the decision in unpublished cases (Keele et al. 2009) nor the decision to
publish (Merritt and Brudney 2001). To rule out strategic use of keywords or citation of Supreme Court
precedent, we propose an omnibus test to collectively address deviations from strict exogeneity: we examine
how similar the string of actual panel assignments is to a random string. To see random strings as an omnibus
test: Suppose Democrats publish cases and Republican judges do not. In order for this to explain any effects,
we should expect Democrat judges to violate the random strings test.
We assess deviations from random assignment by examining whether the sequence of proportions of judges
is similar to a random process. Appendix Figure 5 suggests visually that panel composition is not serially
correlated. Formally, we:
1. Proposing a statistic that can be computed from the sequence of numbers of Democrats per seat
within a Circuit.
2. Computing the statistic for the actual sequence, s∗.
3. Computing the statistic for each of 1,000 bootstrap samples from the actual sequence, i.e., s1, s2, s3
. . .sn. Since there were changes in the expected number of Democrats per seat over time, we treat
our bootstrap samples as a vector of realized random variables, with the probability based on the
expectation during the Circuit-year.
4. Computing the empirical p-value, pi by determining where s∗ fits into s1, s2, s3 . . .sn.
5. Repeating steps 1-4 and calculate pi for each unit.
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TABLE XIII
Randomization Check: P-values
Democratic Appointees assigned to Free Speech Cases
distance size 90% 95% 99%
Autocorrelation 0.188 12 0.338 0.375 0.450
Mean Reversion 0.274 12 0.338 0.375 0.450
Longest Run 0.376 10 0.368 0.410 0.490
We use the following statistics:
Autocorrelation: We see if the value in the jth case depends on the outcome in the j-1thcase. This
statistic can detect whether judicial assignments are “clustered,” meaning a higher than expected number of
back-to-back seat assignments to a particular type of judge. This test tells us whether certain judges sought
out free speech cases, perhaps in sequence.
Mean-Reversion: We test whether there is any form of mean reversion in the sequence, meaning that
the assignment in the nth case is correlated with the assignment in previous n − 1 cases. This test tells us
whether judges or their assignors were attempting to equilibrate their presence, considering whether a judge
was “due” for a free speech case.
Longest-Run: We test whether there are abnormally long “runs” of certain types of judges per seat. This
test tells us whether certain Circuits may have assigned certain judges with free speech cases during certain
time periods (e.g., to achieve specialization).
Number of Runs: Instead of simulating 1000 random strings, we compute the exact statistic for number
of runs. This test captures violations of randomization at the case level rather than Circuit-year. In power
calculations, this test has less Type II error compared to the other tests.
With a truly random process, the collection of all unit p-values should be uniformly distributed. The
1001th random string should have a summary statistic that is equally likely to be anywhere from 1 to
1000. A visual examination suggests that the empirical distributions for our p-values approach the CDF
of a uniform distribution. Appendix Figure 6 presents each Circuit as one dot. Table XIII shows that the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic cannot reject the distribution of p-values is different from the uniform.
Random strings test complements standard randomization checks (e.g., examinations of (1) leads and
(2) correlations between judicial composition and pre-determined case characteristics). If pre-determined
covariates occur randomly over time, checks of (2) miss non-random serial correlation in judicial composition
while the random strings test would miss correlations between judicial composition and pre-determined
covariates.
We also stack the strings across Circuits and across biographical characteristics and run an autocorrelation
test and compare the F statistic with F statistics generated from randomly assigning available judges to cases.
The results are consistent with randomization.
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Other variations from random assignment include: remanded cases from the Supreme Court are returned
to the original panel; en banc cases that are heard by the entire pool of judges (or a significant fraction in
the Ninth Circuit); judges with conflict of interests opt out after random assignment, which is extremely
rare. We do not use remanded or en banc cases, which are also relatively infrequent. Judges can also take
sick leave or go on vacation, but this is determined far in advance.
Our identification strategy assumes that idiosyncratic deviations from random assignment are ignorable.
Even a gold-standard random process — the roll of a die — has a deterministic element. If known with
precision, the force and torque applied to the die, the subtle air currents, the hardness of the surface, etc.,
might allow us (or a physicist) to determine with certainty the outcome of these “random” rolls. Despite
this obvious non-randomness, we would still have faith in the outcome of a trial with treatment assignments
based on die rolls because we are certain that the factors affecting the assignment have no impact on the
outcome of interest and hence are ignorable.
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D District Courts
Litigants’ decision to appeal may respond to previous years’ legal decisions, however, so controlling for
1[Mct > 0] may bias the coefficient for Lawct; the bias is more severe for more distant lags and non-
existent for the most advanced lead. We assess whether this potential endogeneity is a significant concern by
comparing β1(t−n) when we instrument for 1[Mct > 0] using the random assignment of District Court judges.
District judge demographic characteristics are correlated with reversal rates in the Courts of Appeals (Haire,
Songer, and Lindquist 2003; Sen 2015; Barondes 2010; Steinbuch 2009); and expected reversal rates could
encourage litigants to pursue an appeal. If 1[Mct > 0] and Lawct are both identified, estimates should be
roughly invariant to the inclusion or exclusion of additional lags and leads (including lags that are important
predictors of the outcome improves statistical precision, but losing data at the beginning and end period
reduces precision) and lead coefficients being 0 provide an omnibus check of our instrumental variable being
endogenous to pre-existing trends.
District Courts assign one judge to a case randomly or rotationally (Taha 2009; Bird 1975). Cases being
returned on remand from the Courts of Appeals are not randomly assigned. We do not use remanded cases
in our dataset. For example, one District told us that random assignment occurs within 24 hours of a case
filing, which is handled in the order of its arrival. Waldfogel (1995) reports that one District Court uses
three separate randomization wheels and each wheel corresponds to the anticipated case length. Related
cases (meaning that one decision will substantially resolve all cases), if filed within a few weeks, may be
consolidated. Waldfogel (1995) reports that plaintiffs can argue the case is related to another pending case
and, if the judge agrees, the cases will be consolidated. A clerk reported 8% of filed cases were accepted as
related in 1991 in SDNY. In another District Court, if a clerk identifies and two judges agree that a new
civil case is related to another open civil case, they will be consolidated in the interests of justice or judicial
economy. The clerk brings the possible connection to the attention of the judge of the new case, who then
confers with the judge of the earlier case to determine whether they are in fact related cases. Consolidation
would only occur for relatively high-frequency case types. For the handful of District cases that do overlap
such that they are consolidated, we assume the decisions about case relatedness occur in a manner exogenous
to judge assignment.
To instrument for 1[Mct > 0], we define our District IV as follows. wct =
∑J
d=1Kcdt∗
(
Lcdt
Kcdt
)
∑J
d=1Kcdt
, where Kcdt
denotes the number of cases filed in District court d within Circuit c at time t (J goes from 5 to 13 depending
on the District). Lcdt denotes the number of judges with a particular characteristic assigned to cases. The
intuition is that assigning District judges who are disproportionately appealed leads to an appeal in the
Circuit, 1[Mct > 0]. Note that this assumes Kcdt > 0. An approximation is to define Kcdt ∗
(
Lcdt
Kcdt
)
as 0 if
Kcdt = 0. Then, the instrument can be constructed if
∑J
d=1Kcdt > 0, which holds as we have a large number
of district cases.
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Unlike for Courts of Appeals cases, we cannot use the random strings test as an omnibus assessment for
violations of random assignment, because some Districts use rotational assignment or random drawing of
judges from card decks without replacement. So we discuss the concerns qualitatively and suggest another
empirical test. First, District Courts judges are revealed much earlier than Courts of Appeals judges. Ideally,
we would use docket filings in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, but judges are omitted for most
cases prior to 2000, so we must use published District opinions to construct our District IV. So, we buttress
the assumption that settlement, publication, and strategic use of keywords or citations are exogenous: 1)
in District Courts, judges are much more constrained and ideology has been found to play hardly any role.
Judicial ideology does not predict settlement rates (Ashenfelter et al. 1995; Nielsen et al. 2010), settlement
fees (Fitzpatrick 2010), publication choice (Taha 2004), or decisions in published or unpublished cases (Keele
et al. 2009)—this last fact is consistent with the District judge identity only affecting outcomes through the
presence of an appeal but not through the District Court decision, but this exclusion restriction is not
necessary for the primary counterfactual; 2) we examine these issues directly as follows.
Since the random strings test is ineffective for District Courts, we test whether District Court judicial
biographical characteristics in filed cases jointly predict publication. We link PACER filing data, which has
judge identity, to AOC data, which has information on publication. We obtained all freely available PACER
(Public Access to Court Electronic Records) data on District cases from 32 districts for 1980 to 2008 for a total
of 359,595 non-duplicated cases. This data contains the name of the District where the case was filed, the filing
and termination date (missing for 10% of cases), the assigned docket number, and the name of the District or
magistrate judge presiding on the case. We merge the names of the judges into the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts (AOC) database. We use LASSO to select biographical characteristics and no characteristic
was chosen. We assume that remaining deviations from random assignment, like vacation days, are ignorable.
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E Experiment
We recruited workers through Amazon Mechanical Turk. We posted a single placeholder task containing
a description of the work and a link for workers to follow if they want to participate. The subjects were
then randomized, via stratification in the order in which they arrived at the job, to one of several treatment
conditions. Treatment was not revealed at this early stage. All workers saw identical instructions.
We asked workers to transcribe paragraphs from a Tagalog translation of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of
Nations as well as English paragraphs of dictionary definitions. This task is sufficiently tedious that no one is
likely to do it “for fun,” and it is sufficiently simple that all market participants can do the task. The source
text was machine-translated to prevent subjects from finding the text elsewhere on the Internet. We minimize
attrition through a commitment mechanism. In all treatment conditions, workers faced an identical “lock-in”
task in order to minimize differential attrition before the treatment was revealed. The lock-in successfully
reduces attrition.
1 of 3 Lock-in Tasks: Kaya sa isip o diwa na tayo ay sa mga ito, excites ilang mga antas ng
parehong damdamin, sa proporsyon ng kasiglahan o dulness ng kuru-kuro. Ang labis na kung saan
sila magbuntis sa kahirapan ng mga wretches nakakaapekto sa partikular na bahagi sa kanilang mga
sarili ng higit pa sa anumang iba pang; dahil sa takot na arises mula sa kathang isip nila kung ano
ang kani-kanilang mga sarili ay magtiis, kung sila ay talagang ang wretches kanino sila ay naghahanap
sa, at kung sa partikular na bahagi sa kanilang mga sarili ay talagang apektado sa parehong miserable
paraan. Ang tunay na puwersa ng mga kuru-kuro na ito ay sapat na, sa kanilang mga masasaktin
frame, upang gumawa ng na galis o hindi mapalagay damdam complained ng.
The payment for each paragraph was 10 cents with workers able to receive much more in bonuses, including
a 50-cent bonus for completing the survey from the GSS at the end. A paragraph takes about 100 seconds to
enter so the offered payment of 10 cents per paragraph is equivalent to $86.40 per day. The federal minimum
wage in the Unites States was $58/day. In India, payment rate depends on the type of work done, although
the "floor" for data entry positions appears to be about $6.38/day.46 An example paragraph was displayed
on the first page of the external hosting site so workers were aware of the high payment before entering the
study.47
After the lock-in task of three paragraphs, treatment was revealed. Original newspaper articles are avail-
able on request.
46Payscale, Salary Snapshot for Data Entry Operator Jobs, http://www.payscale.com/research/IN/Job=Data_Entry-
_Operator/Salary?, accessed June 17, 2011.
47In fact, one worker emailed saying that 10 cents was too high and that the typical payment for this sort
of data entry was 3 cents per paragraph.
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Treatment 1 (Conservative): A federal court has ruled that the North Carolina legislature may
ban the sale of hardcore pornography in bookstores. The North Carolina legislature had enacted the
ban as a nuisance abatement measure. The legislature considered adult bookstores to be nuisances.
Adult bookstore owners had challenged the North Carolina statute as unconstitutional. They argued
that the statute would be restricting expression before they reach the public and before they are deemed
obscene or not. In general, prior restraints on speech are unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
However, the First Amendment does not protect obscene speech. The Fourth Circuit court said that
statute’s prior restraints on explicit photographs and films are acceptable, because they applied only
to films and photos sold in hardcore pornography stores. The speech was not completely limited since
other stores, such as regular newsstands, could still sell the material.
Treatment 2 (Conservative): Hillsborough County soon will begin enforcing its strict ordinances
governing adult businesses now that a federal appeals court has ruled the restrictions are constitutional.
County Attorney Renee Lee said the county does not yet have a timeframe for compliance. The ruling
from the 11th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals means that dancers at bikini bars will have to stay 6
feet away from patrons, and the sale or consumption of alcohol will be prohibited at adult businesses.
Additionally, adult video stores would be prohibited from having private viewing booths and workers
would have to pass a criminal background check before they are hired. Attorney Scott D. Bergthold, who
represented Hillsborough, said the court’s decision held that the county government “acted reasonably”
in adopting the ordinances. This demonstrates that local governments have the ability to effectively
regulate such establishments to control their negative effects on the community.
Treatment 3 (Progressive): A company may transport obscene magazines as long as the maga-
zines have enough literary content and social value, according to the Fifth Circuit. Michael Travis and
the Peachtree News Company appealed to the Fifth Circuit after prosecutors in a federal trial court
convicted them of twelve counts transporting obscene magazines across state lines. The government
may constitutionally regulate the interstate transport of materials that are defined as obscene. The First
Amendment protects speech generally, making it harder for the government to regulate constitutionally
protected speech. However, obscenity is excluded from First Amendment protections. According to the
Fifth Circuit ruling, the magazines’ pictures alone would be obscene. But six of the magazines also had
short stories and discussions of lesbianism, homosexuality, nudity, censorship, photography, marital
sexual problems, and fine art. These gave them enough social value to merit constitutional protection.
Treatment 4 (Progressive): The Boys of Cocodorm – Snow Bunni, J Fizzo, et al – are staying
put, after a federal judge ruled that the gay porn website has a right to film out of its Edgewater home.
Cocodorm.com features black and Hispanic men, known as “dorm dudes,” who share a webcam-filled
house together and have sex on schedule. For that they are paid at least $1,200 a month, plus free room
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and board. Miami has tried to shut the house down, arguing it constitutes an adult business illegally
operation in a residential area. The city’s Code Enforcement Board in 2007 agreed, but Cocodorm re-
sponded to the code enforcement proceedings by suing in federal court. From the outside, the Cocodorm
house looks like any other residence. Those who want to see Cocodorm’s “hottest and horniest” do so
via the Internet, with a credit card.
Treatment 5 (Control): The IAU has so far recognized five dwarf planets differentiated from
planets by a parameter of “planetary discriminant.” According to NationMaster Encyclopedia, dwarf
planets follow orbits which are not free from other minor celestial bodies. Simultaneously, they always
circle the Sun and not other celestial objects (they are not satellites). Several dwarf planets have already
been scrutinized effectively. Their physical properties have been calculated through routine Earth-
based observations. Dwarf planets, particularly Pluto, are often mistakenly described as “planetoids”
or “comets”. This confusion stems mostly from their size and surface texture which, in accordance with
varying parameters, can be attributed to various minor celestial bodies. The above names of particular
dwarf planets have also been subject to numerous changes. Until today not all solar system bodies have
been identified and remain unclassified. The list of dwarf planets as well as other celestial bodies will
be constantly altered.
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